2003 (8) TMI 529 - SC - Indian Laws

Section 133 Criminal Procedure Code remains valid despite Water Act 1974 and Air Act 1981 environmental legislation coexisting

State of M.P. Versus. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. & Ors.

The SC held that Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was not impliedly repealed by the Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981. The court ... Whether after introduction of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Water Act’) and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Air Act’), there was implied repeal of Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Code’)? 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal questions considered by the Court were:Whether the enactment of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 impliedly repealed Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code), particularly in relation to public nuisance caused by water and air pollution from industrial units.Whether Section 133 of the Code and the Water and Air Acts operate in the same field, and if so, whether they can co-exist or are mutually exclusive.The scope and nature of Section 133 of the Code in contrast to the Water and Air Acts, including whether Section 133 applies to ongoing nuisance or to potential future nuisance.The applicability of the doctrine of implied repeal in the context of these statutes and the principles governing such repeal.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue 1: Whether the Water Act and Air Act impliedly repeal Section 133 of the CodeRelevant legal framework and precedents: Section 133 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to issue orders to remove public nuisance, focusing on urgent preventive action. The Water Act and Air Act are special statutes aimed at prevention and control of pollution, containing specific provisions for enforcement, penalties, and remedial measures. The doctrine of implied repeal requires that repeal be inferred only if the later statute is so inconsistent or repugnant to the earlier that both cannot stand together. The presumption against implied repeal is strong, as established in precedents such as Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker. The principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius further strengthens the presumption against implied repeal when a statute expressly repeals certain laws but not others.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the Water and Air Acts are special laws dealing with specific types of nuisance-pollution of water and air-whereas Section 133 of the Code is a general provision aimed at public nuisance with an emphasis on urgency and prevention of imminent danger. The Court observed that the Water and Air Acts provide both preventive and penal measures, whereas Section 133 is primarily preventive and civil in nature. The Court emphasized that the two statutes operate in different fields and can co-exist. It rejected the High Court's view that the Water and Air Acts impliedly repeal Section 133 of the Code, holding that the provisions are not repugnant or inconsistent to the extent that they cannot stand together.Key evidence and findings: The factual background involved orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) under Section 133 directing closure of industrial units on grounds of pollution causing public nuisance. The respondents challenged these orders on the basis that the Water and Air Acts impliedly repeal Section 133. The High Court had held that the Water and Air Acts impliedly repealed Section 133, but the Supreme Court found this conclusion legally untenable.Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principles governing implied repeal, scrutinizing the scope and object of the statutes. It found the Water and Air Acts to be special laws with detailed provisions for pollution control, but not exhaustive codes replacing Section 133. The Code's Section 133 continues to have application in cases of public nuisance beyond the scope of the pollution statutes. The Court held that the two can operate simultaneously without conflict.Treatment of competing arguments: The State and the Pollution Control Board argued for coexistence of the statutes, stressing the presumption against implied repeal. The respondents contended that the special statutes exclude Section 133's operation in pollution matters. The Court sided with the former, emphasizing legislative intent and statutory interpretation principles.Conclusions: There is no implied repeal of Section 133 of the Code by the Water and Air Acts. The two sets of laws operate in their respective fields and can be applied concurrently.Issue 2: Scope and nature of Section 133 of the Code in relation to nuisance caused by pollutionRelevant legal framework and precedents: Section 133 is part of Chapter X of the Code dealing with public order and tranquility, specifically public nuisance. The Court relied on Halsbury's Laws of England and prior judgments such as Vasant Manga Nikumba v. Baburao Bhikanna Naidu to elucidate the concept of nuisance as an act or omission materially interfering with ordinary physical comfort. The Court distinguished Section 133 from Section 144 of the Code, noting that Section 133 deals with conditional orders to prevent imminent danger, whereas Section 144 is a more general and absolute preventive provision.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that Section 133 applies only when nuisance is in existence and imminent danger to life or property is present. It is not intended to address potential or future nuisance. The proceedings under Section 133 are civil in nature, not criminal, and the person against whom the order is passed is not considered an accused. The Court noted that water and air pollution constitute species of nuisance and can be addressed under Section 133 alongside the special statutes.Key evidence and findings: The SDM's orders were based on the discharge of effluents causing public nuisance. The Court found that Section 133's preventive scope is relevant to such situations where immediate action is necessary to prevent irreparable harm.Application of law to facts: The Court held that Section 133 can be invoked to address public nuisance caused by pollution, provided the nuisance is imminent and existing. It rejected the notion that the Water and Air Acts provide an exhaustive remedy excluding Section 133.Treatment of competing arguments: The respondents argued that pollution control is exclusively within the domain of the Water and Air Acts. The Court acknowledged the special nature of these Acts but maintained that Section 133 retains its preventive jurisdiction in appropriate cases.Conclusions: Section 133 of the Code remains a valid and operative provision for addressing public nuisance caused by pollution, particularly where urgent preventive action is required.Issue 3: Principles governing implied repeal and legislative intentRelevant legal framework and precedents: The Court reiterated the strong presumption against implied repeal, citing multiple authoritative decisions. It outlined the three key questions to determine implied repeal: direct conflict between provisions, legislative intent to create an exhaustive code, and whether the two laws occupy the same field.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court applied these principles and found no direct conflict or repugnancy between Section 133 and the Water and Air Acts. It held that the Legislature did not intend to create an exhaustive code in the pollution statutes that would exclude Section 133. The two laws do not occupy the exact same field; rather, they address overlapping but distinct aspects of public nuisance and pollution control.Key evidence and findings: The absence of an express repealing provision in the Water and Air Acts and the coexistence of their provisions with Section 133 supported the conclusion against implied repeal.Application of law to facts: The Court found that the Water and Air Acts are complementary to, not replacements of, Section 133. The legislative intent was to enhance pollution control without displacing existing preventive measures under the Code.Treatment of competing arguments: The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning that coexistence would cause inconvenience or absurdity, emphasizing that the legal framework permits multiple remedies for public nuisance.Conclusions: The doctrine of implied repeal does not apply, and Section 133 of the Code continues to operate alongside the Water and Air Acts.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGSThe Court held:'The area of operation in the Code and the pollution laws in question are different with wholly different aims and objects; and though they alleviate nuisance, that is not of identical nature. They operate in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side.''While as noted above the provisions of Section 133 of the Code are in the nature of preventive measures, the provisions contained in the two Acts are not only curative but also preventive and penal. The provisions appear to be mutually exclusive and the question of one replacing the other does not arise.''The presumption against a repeal by implication... When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'Core principles established include:Strong presumption against implied repeal, especially where the later statute expressly repeals certain laws but not the earlier provision in question.Section 133 of the Code and the Water and Air Acts can coexist and be applied concurrently as they address different aspects and types of nuisance.Section 133 applies to imminent and existing public nuisance requiring urgent preventive action, whereas the Water and Air Acts provide detailed regulatory, preventive, and penal frameworks for pollution control.Legislative intent is paramount and must be discerned from the scope, object, and provisions of the statutes rather than assumed from potential overlaps.Final determinations on each issue were that the Water and Air Acts do not impliedly repeal Section 133 of the Code; Section 133 remains operative and applicable to public nuisance caused by pollution; and the two sets of laws operate in different but complementary fields without conflict.