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Issues: Whether the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 impliedly repealed Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and thereby deprived the Magistrate of jurisdiction to act against public nuisance caused by industrial pollution.
Analysis: Section 133 of the Code is a preventive provision dealing with existing public nuisance and immediate action to avert imminent danger. The Water Act and the Air Act are special enactments concerned with prevention, control, curative measures, and penal consequences for water and air pollution. The statutory schemes operate in different fields and are not so inconsistent or repugnant that both cannot stand together. The presumption is against repeal by implication, and such repeal arises only when the later law is plainly inconsistent with the earlier law or occupies the same field so exhaustively that coexistence is impossible. The environmental statutes do not extinguish the summary public nuisance jurisdiction under Section 133 of the Code.
Conclusion: Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not impliedly repealed by the Water Act or the Air Act, and the Magistrate retained jurisdiction to act where public nuisance was made out.
Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded on the question of implied repeal and jurisdiction, and the contrary view of the High Court was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: A later special statute does not impliedly repeal an earlier preventive provision unless the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot operate concurrently in their respective fields.