Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) whether the right to travel abroad, protected by Article 21, can be curtailed by executive action without a governing statute or controlling statutory provision; (ii) whether the Passports Act, 1967 occupies the field so as to exclude LOCs issued under the Office Memoranda; (iii) whether the inclusion of Chairmen, Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of public sector banks as authorities competent to request LOCs is valid; and (iv) whether LOCs issued at the instance of public sector banks are valid under Articles 14 and 21.
Issue (i): whether the right to travel abroad, protected by Article 21, can be curtailed by executive action without a governing statute or controlling statutory provision.
Analysis: The right to travel abroad forms part of personal liberty under Article 21. Deprivation of that right must satisfy procedure established by law, and executive instructions by themselves do not amount to such law. The constitutional requirement is not met by a mere administrative framework when the consequence is restraint on personal liberty.
Conclusion: No. Executive action alone cannot curtail the right to travel abroad.
Issue (ii): whether the Passports Act, 1967 occupies the field so as to exclude LOCs issued under the Office Memoranda.
Analysis: The Passports Act provides a statutory scheme for issue, refusal, impounding, revocation and suspension of passports and travel documents, but it does not exhaust every possible form of travel-related restriction. LOCs may still be authorised in other legitimate contexts, such as requests from other agencies or orders of courts. The field is therefore not fully occupied in the broad sense contended for.
Conclusion: The field is not fully occupied by the Passports Act, and the Office Memoranda are not invalid on that ground.
Issue (iii): whether the inclusion of Chairmen, Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of public sector banks as authorities competent to request LOCs is valid.
Analysis: The inclusion of only public sector banks creates an impermissible and irrational classification. It singles out borrowers of public sector banks for a coercive restraint on liberty while excluding similarly situated borrowers of private banks, without a demonstrated nexus to the object of the measure. The power is also unguided and uncanalised, and the affected person is exposed to action by an interested creditor without adequate safeguards.
Conclusion: The inclusion is invalid and liable to be struck down.
Issue (iv): whether LOCs issued at the instance of public sector banks are valid under Articles 14 and 21.
Analysis: The LOCs were issued without prior notice, without hearing, without disclosure of reasons, without a copy of the LOC, and without any meaningful avenue of representation. They therefore offend natural justice, are disproportionate to the object of debt recovery, and cannot be justified by equating the financial interest of a bank with the economic interests of India. The measures fail the standards of fairness, reasonableness and proportionality required where a fundamental right is curtailed.
Conclusion: No. The impugned LOCs are unconstitutional and invalid.
Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeds in part. The power given to public sector banks to request LOCs is struck down, and the LOCs issued under that arrangement are set aside, while the remaining framework and other lawful restraints available under statute or court order are left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: A restraint on the fundamental right to travel abroad must rest on a valid law and a fair, reasonable and proportionate procedure; executive instructions cannot, by themselves, authorise coercive deprivation of personal liberty.