Former tribunal members barred from practising before the same tribunal; statutory restriction upheld as reasonable and public-interest based.

Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 was upheld as a valid reasonable restriction on the right to practise before the Tribunal, because it was narrowly targeted to former Tribunal members and served the public interest in institutional integrity, avoidance of bias, and public confidence. The Court held that the provision applied to persons who had already demitted office before its insertion, treating it as a retroactive regulation of an existing practice right rather than a retrospective penalty. Section 146A was construed harmoniously and could not override the specific disqualification in Section 129(6).

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962, which bars former President, Vice-President or Member of the Appellate Tribunal from appearing, acting or pleading before it, is unconstitutional under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 applies to persons who had been appointed to and had demitted office from the Tribunal before its insertion. (iii) Whether Section 146A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits such persons to appear before the Tribunal notwithstanding the bar under Section 129(6).

Issue (i): Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962, which bars former President, Vice-President or Member of the Appellate Tribunal from appearing, acting or pleading before it, is unconstitutional under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The restriction was held to be a valid legislative control on the right to practice and not an absolute prohibition. The right of an advocate is subject to lawfully imposed reasonable restrictions, and the impugned bar was found to be limited to the very Tribunal in which the person had earlier held office. The Court accepted the legislative object of preserving institutional integrity, avoiding any real or apparent bias, and maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. The classification was found to have a rational nexus with that object and the provision was treated as a reasonable restriction in public interest.

Conclusion: The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 129(6) failed and the provision was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 applies to persons who had been appointed to and had demitted office from the Tribunal before its insertion.

Analysis: The Court held that the provision was not retrospectively punitive. It operated in the present on the existing right to appear before the Tribunal and therefore had retroactive effect, not impermissible retrospectivity. The right to practice before that forum was treated as a regulated statutory right, and the amendment was held applicable uniformly to all concerned advocates, including those who had earlier served as Tribunal members. The Court rejected the contention that prior appointment or prior demitting of office created a vested immunity from the newly imposed restriction.

Conclusion: Section 129(6) was held applicable to the appellants notwithstanding that they had ceased to be Tribunal members before its insertion.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 146A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits such persons to appear before the Tribunal notwithstanding the bar under Section 129(6).

Analysis: The Court construed the provisions harmoniously and held that Section 146A could not override the specific disqualification created by Section 129(6). A person disqualified under Section 129(6) could not derive any contrary entitlement from Section 146A. The specific restriction was therefore given effect according to its plain purpose.

Conclusion: The contention based on Section 146A was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar on former Tribunal members appearing before the same Tribunal was upheld as a reasonable, public-interest restriction, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A narrowly tailored statutory restriction preventing former adjudicatory members from practising before the very tribunal they earlier served is a reasonable restriction on the right to practise when justified by public interest, avoidance of bias, and institutional integrity, and may validly apply to existing practitioners as a retroactive regulation rather than a retrospective penalty.

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