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Issues: (i) whether sections 9 to 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 and the notification issued thereunder violated article 14 of the Constitution by creating discriminatory classification for trial before Special Courts; (ii) whether the provisions amounted to an impermissible delegation of legislative power.
Issue (i): whether sections 9 to 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 and the notification issued thereunder violated article 14 of the Constitution by creating discriminatory classification for trial before Special Courts
Analysis: The majority held that article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification. The challenged Ordinance was read with its preamble and surrounding circumstances, which disclosed a definite public purpose of maintaining public safety, public order, and peace and tranquillity in disturbed areas. On that basis, the power to select specified offences or classes of offences for trial by Special Courts was treated as a controlled power, not an unguided one. The majority further held that the notified offences formed a rational class connected with the objective of dealing speedily with serious regional crime, and that the difference from ordinary procedure did not, by itself, amount to unconstitutional discrimination.
Conclusion: The challenge under article 14 failed; the provisions and notification were upheld as constitutionally valid.
Issue (ii): whether the provisions amounted to an impermissible delegation of legislative power
Analysis: The majority treated the arrangement as conditional legislation rather than unlawful delegation. The legislative policy was stated in the Ordinance itself, and the executive was only authorized to determine the local application of the special procedure within that policy framework. The majority relied on established authority to hold that such legislative arrangement was constitutionally competent.
Conclusion: The contention based on excessive delegation failed.
Final Conclusion: The preliminary challenge to the jurisdiction of the Special Court was rejected, and the matter was allowed to proceed on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi: A statute authorising special procedure for a class of offences will not offend article 14 if the classification has a rational relation to a clearly stated legislative objective, and executive determination of the local or factual application of that policy constitutes valid conditional legislation rather than unconstitutional delegation.
Dissenting Opinion: Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. and Bose J. held that the Ordinance offended article 14 because it supplied no rational classification and conferred arbitrary discretion, and they would have set aside the convictions and ordered retrial under the ordinary procedure.