Equal treatment and reasonable classification: pregnancy-based termination and unguided extension discretion were struck down.

Air hostesses were treated as a separate class from assistant flight pursers and flight stewards because their recruitment, qualifications, grades, promotion channels and retiral benefits differed, so the resulting service distinctions did not violate Articles 14 or 16. A contractual restriction on marriage within four years was upheld as a service condition linked to the post, but termination on first pregnancy was struck down as wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional. The lower retirement age for this category was upheld in principle, yet the Managing Director's unrestricted power to grant or refuse extension of service was invalidated for conferring unguided discretion contrary to Article 14.

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Issues: (i) whether air hostesses constituted a separate class from assistant flight pursers or flight stewards so that differences in service conditions, promotional avenues and retirement benefits did not attract Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether the provisions terminating service on marriage within four years or on first pregnancy were valid; and (iii) whether the retirement-age scheme and the Managing Director's discretion to grant extension of service were constitutionally valid.

Issue (i): whether air hostesses constituted a separate class from assistant flight pursers or flight stewards so that differences in service conditions, promotional avenues and retirement benefits did not attract Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The relevant comparison was between the mode of recruitment, qualifications, grades, seniority, promotional hierarchy, retirement benefits and conditions of service. On those materials, air hostesses were recruited on different terms, started on different grades, had distinct promotional channels and enjoyed different retiral advantages. The governing principle was that equality operates between persons similarly circumstanced, while reasonable classification is permissible where the groups are materially different.

Conclusion: Air hostesses were held to form a separate class, and no violation of Articles 14 or 16 arose merely because their service conditions differed from those of assistant flight pursers or flight stewards.

Issue (ii): whether the provisions terminating service on marriage within four years or on first pregnancy were valid.

Analysis: The restriction on marriage within four years was treated as a service-condition linked to the special character of the post and was not found to be arbitrary. The pregnancy clause, however, was held to be wholly unreasonable. Termination of employment on first pregnancy was considered a nakedly arbitrary and unfair condition with no rational basis, and it was inconsistent with constitutional equality.

Conclusion: The marriage restriction was upheld, but the provision terminating service on first pregnancy was struck down as unconstitutional.

Issue (iii): whether the retirement-age scheme and the Managing Director's discretion to grant extension of service were constitutionally valid.

Analysis: Fixing a lower retirement age for the special category was not, by itself, invalid. However, the power conferred on the Managing Director to extend service was uncontrolled, unguided and without standards, and therefore created a risk of arbitrary differentiation. That conferment of naked discretion was held to offend Article 14. The impugned scheme was severable, so only the discretionary component required invalidation.

Conclusion: The retirement-age scheme was upheld in principle, but the unrestricted discretion to grant or refuse extension of service was struck down as invalid.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part: the pregnancy-based termination rule and the unguided extension power were invalidated, while the separate-class classification and the marriage restriction were sustained, leaving the petitions partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 14 permits differential treatment of a genuinely distinct class of employees, but service conditions that are arbitrary, unguided or based on an irrational disability such as termination on first pregnancy cannot stand.

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