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Issues: (i) Whether the notification revoking jury trial for the Burdwan Test Relief cases was within the power conferred by Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; (ii) Whether the notification offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India by making an arbitrary classification and denying equal protection of the laws; (iii) Whether the defect, if any, was cured by Section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or by the fact that the notification pre-dated the Constitution.
Issue (i): Whether the notification revoking jury trial for the Burdwan Test Relief cases was within the power conferred by Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
Analysis: The power under Section 269(1) extends only to directing trial of all offences or any particular class of offences before the Court of Session by jury, and to revoking or altering such a general order. It does not authorise the State Government to pick out particular cases or particular accused persons and withdraw jury trial only in their cases while leaving other persons charged with the same offences to be tried by jury. The notification here was case-specific and not offence-specific, and therefore exceeded the statutory power.
Conclusion: The notification was ultra vires Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and invalid.
Issue (ii): Whether the notification offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India by making an arbitrary classification and denying equal protection of the laws.
Analysis: A classification is permissible only if founded on a real and substantial distinction having a just relation to the object sought to be achieved. The supposed basis that these cases involved a large volume of evidence and would take a long time was held to have no rational relation to the withdrawal of jury trial, because such features may exist in many serious criminal trials and are no reasonable ground for denying jury trial to one set of accused while retaining it for others similarly placed. The notification therefore singled out a group of accused without a constitutionally valid basis.
Conclusion: The notification was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (iii): Whether the defect, if any, was cured by Section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or by the fact that the notification pre-dated the Constitution.
Analysis: Section 536 deals with procedural irregularities in trial and does not validate a notification that is beyond statutory power or unconstitutional. The objection went to the root of the court's jurisdiction. The fact that the notification was issued before the Constitution did not save the continued trial after the Constitution came into force, because the discriminatory procedure could not be separated from the trial actually held and could not be converted into a valid jury trial at a later stage.
Conclusion: Neither Section 536 nor the pre-Constitution date of the notification cured the illegality.
Final Conclusion: The conviction could not stand because the revocation of jury trial was beyond statutory authority and contrary to Article 14, and the trial held under that notification was bad in law.
Ratio Decidendi: A statute empowering the State to direct or revoke jury trial by reference only to offences or classes of offences does not permit case-specific discrimination, and any procedural classification denying equal protection must rest on a real and reasonable distinction directly related to the object of the law.