Equal procedural protection and severability preserve a pre-Constitution trial regulation despite one discriminatory provision.

A pre-Constitution procedural regulation is not wholly invalid after the Constitution merely because one provision is discriminatory; only the inconsistent part is inoperative if the accused was not deprived of the substance of equal procedural protection. The exclusion of committal proceedings and use of warrant procedure did not amount to substantial procedural inequality, the transfer power remained intact, and the restriction on revision applied only to non-appealable sentences. The withdrawal of confirmation for death sentences was discriminatory and invalid to that extent, but the defect was severable and did not affect the conviction. Delegation of authority to make over cases by reference to office, rather than personal naming, was valid.

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Issues: Whether the special trial procedure under the impugned Regulation violated equal protection under the Constitution, and whether the delegation of power to make over the case for trial was invalid.

Analysis: The Regulation was a pre-Constitution enactment, and its validity after the Constitution depended on whether the post-Constitution procedure actually denied the accused the substance of a normal trial. The exclusion of committal proceedings and the substitution of warrant procedure did not create a substantial procedural inequality, and the right of transfer was not taken away. The restriction on revision was confined to non-appealable sentences and did not affect the present case. The provision withdrawing confirmation of death sentences was discriminatory and invalid to that extent, but the defect was severable and did not invalidate the trial or conviction. The authority to make over cases could validly be delegated to civil administrators by reference to their office, and personal naming of the delegate was unnecessary.

Conclusion: The constitutional objections failed, and the delegation under the Regulation was valid.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the special trial procedure was rejected, and the petition under Article 32 did not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi: A pre-Constitution procedural law is not rendered wholly void after the Constitution merely because it contains discriminatory provisions; only the inconsistent part is inoperative, and the conviction stands if the accused was not deprived of the substance of equal procedural protection.

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