Appellate Court Upholds Conviction, Dissent Calls Special Procedure Discriminatory

LACHMANDAS KEWALRAM AHUJAAND ANOTHER Versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY

LACHMANDAS KEWALRAM AHUJAAND ANOTHER Versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY - 1952 AIR 235, 1952 (0) SCR 710 Issues:
1. Legality of the trial under the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947.
2. Retrospective application of the Constitution.
3. Discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.
4. Validity of the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act post-Constitution.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the trial under the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947:
The appellants were convicted and sentenced by the Special Judge, Ahmedabad, under the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947, for murder and other offences. The trial was conducted without preliminary enquiry and committal by a Magistrate, which had been dispensed with by the impugned Act. The trial continued even after the Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950, and ended in the conviction of the appellants on March 13, 1950. The High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences. The appellants contended that the trial was illegal as the impugned Act was void under Article 13(1) read with Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. Retrospective application of the Constitution:
The appellants argued that the trial was discriminatory and void as per the decision in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, which held that similar provisions in the Bengal Act were discriminatory. However, it was held that the Constitution does not have retrospective operation and does not affect proceedings commenced before it came into force. The trial, which had validly started before the Constitution, was not vitiated by its subsequent enforcement. The Court referred to Keshavan Madhava Menon's case, which established that the Constitution's provisions on fundamental rights do not operate retrospectively.

3. Discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution:
The appellants claimed that continuing the trial under the special procedure after the Constitution came into force was discriminatory. The Court held that equal protection of the laws means applying the same law to all persons in the same situation without discrimination. The appellants, whose trial had lawfully commenced before the Constitution, were not in the same situation as those who committed similar offences after the Constitution. Therefore, no complaint of discriminatory treatment could be sustained. The jurisdiction of the Special Judge, validly created and exercised before the Constitution, remained unaffected.

4. Validity of the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act post-Constitution:
The Court examined whether the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act, which continued to be applied after the Constitution, was discriminatory. It was argued that the procedural variations, such as recording only a memorandum of evidence and the discretion to refuse to summon witnesses, were not so serious as to amount to a denial of equal protection under Article 14. The Court held that the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to continue the trial remained unaffected by the advent of the Constitution. The alternative was to hold that Article 13(1) read with Article 14 does not affect pending trials even in procedural matters, as held in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case. The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the trial and conviction of the appellants were not vitiated by the continued application of the special procedure after the Constitution came into force.

Separate Judgment:
Das J. delivered a separate judgment, agreeing with the appellants that the continuation of the special procedure after the Constitution came into force constituted a breach of their fundamental right under Article 14. He emphasized that the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act was discriminatory and void post-Constitution. The appellants were entitled to be tried according to the ordinary procedure. The appeals were allowed, and the convictions and sentences were set aside, directing a retrial according to the ordinary procedure.

Conclusion:
The majority judgment upheld the trial and conviction of the appellants, dismissing the appeals. However, Das J. dissented, holding that the continued application of the special procedure post-Constitution was discriminatory and void, allowing the appeals and directing a retrial.