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    <title>1954 (4) TMI 71 - Supreme Court</title>
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    <description>Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 empowered the State Government to direct or revoke jury trial only by reference to offences or classes of offences, not to select particular cases or accused persons for withdrawal of jury trial. The notification was therefore ultra vires and invalid. It also violated Article 14 because the classification was not based on any real and substantial distinction having a rational relation to the object of the law; the asserted need arising from voluminous evidence and delay did not justify treating similarly placed accused differently. Section 536 did not cure the defect, and the pre-Constitution date of the notification did not validate the continued discriminatory trial. The conviction could not stand.</description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 1954 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1954 (4) TMI 71 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=292113</link>
      <description>Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 empowered the State Government to direct or revoke jury trial only by reference to offences or classes of offences, not to select particular cases or accused persons for withdrawal of jury trial. The notification was therefore ultra vires and invalid. It also violated Article 14 because the classification was not based on any real and substantial distinction having a rational relation to the object of the law; the asserted need arising from voluminous evidence and delay did not justify treating similarly placed accused differently. Section 536 did not cure the defect, and the pre-Constitution date of the notification did not validate the continued discriminatory trial. The conviction could not stand.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 1954 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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