Unguided recovery discretion and harsher distraint procedure were found discriminatory under constitutional equality principles.

Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was examined for Article 14 compliance because it left the municipal authority with an unguided choice between distraint and suit for recovering consolidated rate arrears. The Court treated that uncontrolled discretion as discrimination inherent in the statutory scheme and therefore void under Article 13. It also found the distraint process materially more onerous than a suit: it was summary, allowed only a short time to pay or show cause, and authorised immediate seizure and sale of movable property, whereas a suit offered fuller procedural safeguards and appeal rights. On that basis, enforcement of the distress warrant could not be sustained.

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Issues: (i) whether Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was void under Article 13 of the Constitution as offending Article 14 by conferring unguided discretion on the municipal authorities in choosing between distraint and suit for recovery of consolidated rate arrears; and (ii) whether the distraint procedure under Section 237 was more onerous than the suit remedy under Section 251 so as to amount to discriminatory treatment.

Issue (i): whether Section 237 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was void under Article 13 of the Constitution as offending Article 14 by conferring unguided discretion on the municipal authorities in choosing between distraint and suit for recovery of consolidated rate arrears.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provided alternative modes of recovery, but Section 251 did not lay down any principle or policy governing when the Corporation should proceed by suit rather than by distraint. The discretion to select between the two remedies was therefore left uncontrolled. Applying the test of permissible classification, the absence of any intelligible basis or guiding principle meant that discrimination was inherent in the statute itself.

Conclusion: Section 237, read with the alternative recovery scheme, was held to be discriminatory and void under Article 14, and consequently void under Article 13, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): whether the distraint procedure under Section 237 was more onerous than the suit remedy under Section 251 so as to amount to discriminatory treatment.

Analysis: The distraint process was summary in nature, allowed only a short time to pay or show cause, and authorised immediate coercive seizure and sale of movable property. By contrast, a suit afforded fuller procedural safeguards, more time, opportunities for defence, and a right of appeal. The Court held that the distraint remedy was substantially more burdensome and prejudicial than the suit remedy.

Conclusion: The distraint procedure under Section 237 was held to be the more onerous and discriminatory course, and the petitioner was entitled to relief against execution of the distress warrant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned recovery by distress could not be sustained, and the petitioner succeeded in obtaining constitutional relief against enforcement of the warrant. Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal statute leaves the executive with an unguided choice between materially unequal recovery procedures, and one procedure is substantially more onerous than the other, the resulting discrimination offends Article 14 and is void.

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