Press labour regulation upheld, but wage fixation failed for ignoring capacity to pay and a gratuity provision was struck down.

The Supreme Court upheld the Working Journalists Act in most respects, holding that regulation of service conditions and labour protections for journalists did not directly abridge press freedom under Article 19(1)(a) and did not create unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14. It also held that special welfare treatment for journalists was generally permissible under Article 19(1)(g). However, the gratuity provision for a journalist voluntarily resigning after three years was struck down as an excessive and unjustified burden. The Wage Board's decision was declared ultra vires because it failed to genuinely consider the industry's capacity to pay, a mandatory statutory factor, rendering the wage fixation unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether the impugned provisions of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, and the Wage Board's decision violated the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14 and 32 of the Constitution; whether the impugned gratuity provision was unconstitutional; and whether the Wage Board's decision was ultra vires the Act for want of proper consideration of capacity to pay and other statutory requirements.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned Act infringed the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).

Analysis: The measure was directed to regulating service conditions of working journalists and applying ordinary labour-law protections to newspaper establishments. The Court held that such legislation did affect the press in an indirect sense, but it did not have the direct or inevitable effect of curtailing publication, circulation, or editorial freedom. A law affecting the press is not unconstitutional merely because it increases costs or imposes labour obligations, unless its purpose or necessary operation is to abridge freedom of speech and expression beyond the limits of Article 19(2).

Conclusion: The Act did not violate Article 19(1)(a).

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned Act imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g), and whether section 5(1)(a)(iii) was valid.

Analysis: The Court held that special treatment for working journalists was permissible because they formed a distinct class and the Legislature could adopt a separate welfare scheme for them. The wage-board machinery, fixation of wages, gratuity, leave, notice, and recovery provisions were not in themselves unreasonable. However, gratuity payable to a journalist who voluntarily resigned after only three years of service was held to be an excessive and unjustified burden, lacking rational justification as a retirement benefit.

Conclusion: The Act was generally valid under Article 19(1)(g), but section 5(1)(a)(iii) was unconstitutional and struck down.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned Act offended Article 14 by making an arbitrary classification or conferring discriminatory treatment.

Analysis: The classification of working journalists as a separate class was supported by the special nature of their work, their role in the press, and the peculiar conditions of journalism. The different treatment accorded to them, and the recovery machinery provided for enforcement of their dues, had a rational nexus with the object of improving their conditions of service. The law did not discriminate within the class nor was the classification of newspaper employers arbitrary in the constitutional sense.

Conclusion: The Act did not violate Article 14.

Issue (iv): Whether the Wage Board's decision was ultra vires the Act because it ignored the capacity of the industry to pay, classified establishments by gross revenue and chains, fixed scales of wages, gave retrospective effect, and proceeded without adequate procedure or reasons.

Analysis: The Court held that the Wage Board was bound to consider the capacity of the industry to pay as an essential statutory circumstance under section 9(1), and on the record it had not done so in any real or effective manner. The Board had proceeded without adequate data, had not properly assessed the burden on the industry as a whole or region-wise, and its decision was framed on a compromise basis without genuine consideration of the statutory criteria. The absence of reasons was not itself fatal, but the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of considering capacity to pay rendered the decision unsustainable. Other objections, such as reconstitution of the Board, majority decision-making, retrospectivity, and cost-of-living data, were rejected.

Conclusion: The Wage Board's decision dated 30 April 1957 was ultra vires the Act and void.

Final Conclusion: The petitions and connected appeals succeeded to the extent that the impugned wage-board decision was set aside, while the Act was upheld in all material respects except for the gratuity provision for voluntary resignation after three years.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute mandates consideration of a specified economic factor as an essential guide to wage fixation, a wage-fixing decision is invalid if that factor is not genuinely and effectively applied on the record; and a welfare provision imposing an excessive burden unrelated to the nature of the benefit may be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on business.

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