Prior restraint on publication requires real and imminent danger to justice; speculative prejudice cannot justify continued injunction.

A preventive injunction restraining publication on matters touching a pending issue is an exceptional restraint on the press and can be sustained only where there is a real and imminent danger to the due administration of justice. The court balanced Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech against Article 19(2) restrictions, including contempt concerns, and held that remote or speculative prejudice was insufficient. On the facts, the risk of publication frustrating the debenture issue was no longer immediate because the issue had already been over-subscribed, so continued restraint was not justified. The injunction was vacated.

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Issues: Whether the interim injunction restraining publication of articles, comments, reports and editorials concerning the legality or validity of the approvals and consents relating to the debenture issue should continue in order to protect the administration of justice.

Analysis: Freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), including contempt of court, but a preventive injunction against publication is an exceptional restraint on the press. The appropriate approach is to balance the freedom of the press and the due administration of justice and to ask whether there is a real and imminent danger of prejudice, not a remote or speculative one. On the facts, the debenture issue had already been over-subscribed and the stage at which publication might have frustrated the issue had passed. The apprehended harm from further publication was no longer shown to be sufficiently immediate or substantial to justify continued restraint.

Conclusion: The injunction was no longer warranted and the restraint on publication was vacated.

Ratio Decidendi: A preventive injunction restraining publication on a matter pending before the court can be sustained only where there is a real and imminent danger to the due administration of justice and the balance of convenience decisively favours restraint; absent such danger, prior restraint on the press is not justified.

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