Supreme Court Advocates' right to practise in High Courts included acting and pleading, despite Original Side restrictions.

Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 was interpreted by the majority to confer an enforceable right on a Supreme Court Advocate to practise in any High Court in the full sense, including both acting and pleading. The Court held that the non obstante clause overrode inconsistent restrictions in earlier bar council legislation and that the omission of saving clauses showed no intent to preserve Calcutta and Bombay Original Side limits requiring attorney intervention or denying acting rights. The dissent took the narrower view that the provision only removed outside-advocate disabilities and left existing High Court practice rules intact.

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Issues: Whether section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 conferred on an Advocate of the Supreme Court the right to practice in a High Court as including both the right to act and the right to plead, and whether the rules and restrictions of the Calcutta High Court Original Side that confined acting to attorneys and required an attorney's intervention could continue to apply to such an advocate.

Analysis: The majority held that the expression "to practice" in section 2 was used in its full sense, namely, the exercise of the legal profession by both acting and pleading, and not in the restricted sense suggested by the respondents. The statutory object was to grant Supreme Court Advocates an enforceable right to practice in any High Court as of right, and the opening non obstante clause was read as overriding inconsistent provisions in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and other laws regulating the conditions applicable to advocates not entered on a High Court roll. The Court further held that the omission of the saving clauses found in the Bar Councils Act showed that Parliament did not intend to preserve the Calcutta and Bombay Original Side restrictions against Supreme Court Advocates. Rules which required an advocate to obtain an attorney's intervention or prevented him from acting on the Original Side were inconsistent with the statutory right and could not prevail.

Conclusion: A Supreme Court Advocate was entitled as of right to practice in the Calcutta High Court including on its Original Side, and the restrictive Original Side rules could not be enforced against him.

Dissenting Opinion

Analysis: Mukherjea J. and Das J. dissented and held that "to practice" in section 2 meant only to exercise the profession subject to the applicable High Court rules, so that the Act removed only the disabilities of outside advocates in appearing and pleading and did not abrogate the existing Original Side restrictions on acting. They concluded that the petitioner could not claim a right to act on the Original Side in contravention of the High Court rules.

Conclusion: The petition would have been dismissed according to the dissenting view.

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