Advocate cannot claim original-side appearance rights under Section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951; Letters Patent rules limit appearance

The SC held that an Advocate of the Supreme Court cannot, merely by virtue of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, claim the right to act on the Original Side of the Calcutta HC beyond exercising the right to plead; the Letters Patent rules limiting appearance on the Original Side unless instructed by an Attorney govern. The petition seeking such a right was dismissed.

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Issues: Whether section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 entitles an Advocate of the Supreme Court to "practice" in any High Court so as to include the right to act (and not only to appear and plead) in the Original Side of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, thereby rendering void or inoperative any rules or provisions which restrict such right.

Analysis: The Court examined the language and scope of section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates Act read with the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, and the Letters Patent and local rules of the High Courts. The analysis addressed (i) the ordinary/dictionary and contextual meanings of the word "practice" as used in related statutes and rules, (ii) the proper construction and effect of the non obstante clause in section 2, (iii) whether reservations in the Bar Councils Act (notably sections 9(4) and 14(3)) or rules made under Letters Patent could persist so as to limit the statutory right conferred on Supreme Court Advocates, and (iv) practical consequences and coherence with legislative purpose. The majority construed "practice" in section 2 to include both acting and pleading in the absence of any saving or reservation in the new Act; they read the non obstante clause and operative words as abrogating inconsistent provisions and rules that cut down the substantive right conferred. The majority rejected reliance on extrinsic legislative materials and held that rules excluding Supreme Court Advocates from acting in the Original Sides of Calcutta and Bombay are inconsistent with section 2 and therefore inoperative to the extent of the conflict. The dissenting judgments construed "practice" more narrowly (as confined to appearing and pleading and/or subject to existing High Court rules) and warned of practical difficulties in permitting unrestricted acting without specific rule-making authority.

Conclusion: The majority conclusion is that section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951 entitles every Advocate of the Supreme Court as of right to practice in any High Court, including the right to act in the Original Side where such entitlement is not lawfully reserved or saved by the new Act; consequently, rules and provisions purporting to deny that right are repugnant and inoperative so far as they conflict with section 2. The appeal is allowed and the respondents are directed to accept the petitioners warrant of authority.

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