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Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was barred by res judicata and amounted to an abuse of process; (ii) whether the petitioner could invoke the protection of Section 22 of SICA to stall SARFAESI proceedings in view of the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA; (iii) whether the reference made to the BIFR and its registration were void for want of jurisdiction, so that the bank could continue SARFAESI proceedings without BIFR consent.
Issue (i): whether the writ petition was barred by res judicata and amounted to an abuse of process.
Analysis: The same challenge to recovery measures had earlier been litigated and disposed of. The later plea based on pendency before the BIFR could and ought to have been urged in the earlier round. The Court also noted repeated non-compliance with directions to deposit amounts due and successive attempts to delay recovery, which showed misuse of judicial process.
Conclusion: The writ petition was barred by res judicata and was an abuse of process of court, against the petitioner.
Issue (ii): whether the petitioner could invoke the protection of Section 22 of SICA to stall SARFAESI proceedings in view of the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA.
Analysis: Section 22 of SICA suspends proceedings only where a valid inquiry under Section 16 or a sanctioned scheme is pending. After the SARFAESI amendments, the second proviso to Section 15(1) prohibits a reference where financial assets have been acquired by a securitisation or reconstruction company under Section 5(1) of SARFAESI. The Court held that the statutory language was plain and could not be expanded by importing the minimum-debt condition found in the third proviso. In the facts, the second proviso was attracted and Section 22 protection was unavailable.
Conclusion: Section 22 of SICA did not protect the petitioner, and the bank was not required to obtain BIFR consent before proceeding under SARFAESI, against the petitioner.
Issue (iii): whether the reference made to the BIFR and its registration were void for want of jurisdiction, so that the bank could continue SARFAESI proceedings without BIFR consent.
Analysis: Once the second proviso to Section 15(1) applied, no valid reference could be made. The consequent registration of the reference and any further steps taken by the BIFR lacked jurisdiction and were a nullity. An order suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction can be questioned even in collateral proceedings, and a void proceeding cannot found a claim to restraint against SARFAESI measures.
Conclusion: The BIFR reference and its registration were void, and the bank was free to continue SARFAESI proceedings, against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme of SARFAESI prevailed on the facts, the petitioner could not claim SICA protection, and the challenge to possession and recovery failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA is attracted because financial assets have been acquired under Section 5(1) of SARFAESI, no valid reference to the BIFR can be made, Section 22 of SICA does not operate, and SARFAESI recovery may proceed without BIFR consent.