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Issues: (i) Whether the Court retains jurisdiction to enlarge the time fixed for performance of an act after the period has expired but before a final order disposing of the proceeding is passed. (ii) Whether an order dismissing a suit for default in payment of adjournment costs is a decree and is appealable.
Issue (i): Whether the Court retains jurisdiction to enlarge the time fixed for performance of an act after the period has expired but before a final order disposing of the proceeding is passed.
Analysis: The power under Section 148 is wide and permits enlargement of time from time to time even after the original period has expired. The Court does not become functus officio merely because the time fixed has lapsed; jurisdiction continues until a formal order finally disposing of the proceeding is made. The discretion to grant or refuse enlargement remains with the Court, but expiry of time by itself does not extinguish jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The Court retains jurisdiction to extend time until it passes a final order disposing of the suit or proceeding.
Issue (ii): Whether an order dismissing a suit for default in payment of adjournment costs is a decree and is appealable.
Analysis: The expression "default" in Section 2(2) of the Code, read with the scheme of Order 9 and Order 17, is confined to default of appearance for the purpose of excluding such orders from the definition of decree. By contrast, "default" in Order 17, Rule 3 is contextual and includes non-performance of the act ordered by the Court, including payment of costs. To avoid conflict between provisions and to advance the remedy, an order dismissing a suit for non-payment of adjournment costs is treated as falling within Order 17, Rule 3 and not as a mere non-appearing default.
Conclusion: An order dismissing a suit for default in payment of costs is appealable as a decree.
Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the suit was unsustainable because the plaintiff could validly comply with the costs order on the reopening day after the Court closure, and the matter had to proceed in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A court retains power under Section 148 to enlarge time until it passes a final order disposing of the proceeding, and an order dismissing a suit for non-payment of adjournment costs is a decree appealable under the Code because the relevant concept of default is context-dependent.