1981 (4) TMI 9 - SC - Income Tax

Chamber of commerce income from trade fairs and conferences exempt from taxation under section 11(1)(a) for charitable purposes

Commissioner of Income-Tax, New Delhi Versus Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce And Industry

The SC held that income derived by a chamber of commerce from organizing trade fairs and sponsoring conferences was exempt from taxation. The assessee's ... Liability to pay tax - Entitlement to exemption under s. 11(i)(a) read with s. 2(15) - income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes within the meaning of section 11(1) - object of the Federation is of general public utility - onus to prove - assessee is the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Federation) - Meaning of word 'involve' - doctrine of dominant or primary object. PATHAK J. - HELD THAT:- In view of the majority opinion of this court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Assn.[1979 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], the reference must be answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. A.P. Sen, J. - HELD THAT:- The majority in the Surat Art Silk case [1979 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], has evolved the doctrine of dominant or primary object and there is little that we can do about it. Faced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the revenue advanced no submissions with regard to the questions referred and indeed in view of the majority decision in Surat Art Silk case, the answers to the questions are self-evident. The doctrine of dominant or primary object must, as laid down in Surat Art Silk case, hold the field till there is a change in the law. Undoubtedly, the activities of the assessee in regard to holding of the Indian Trade Fair and sponsoring the Conference of the Afro-Asian Organisation in the relevant accounting year were for the advancement of the dominant object and purpose of the trust, viz., promotion, protection and development of trade, commerce and industry in India. Learned counsel for the revenue, with his usual fairness, conceded that the income derived by the assessee from such activities was exempt under s. 11(1)(a) read with s. 2(15) of the Act. The contention advanced cannot be accepted, for the reason that no such, point was ever raised at any stage of the proceedings, much less before the Appellate Tribunal. Even otherwise, there appears to be no substance in the contention. There is a distinction between the 'purpose of a trust and the' powers 'conferred upon the trustees as incidental to the carrying out of the purpose. For instance, cl. 3(v) enables the establishment and support of associations, institutions, funds, trusts and convenience calculated to benefit the employees and their dependants, for making provisions for grant of pension and allowances, etc. The framing of such employee benefit schemes is essential and necessary for the proper functioning of the organisation and is incidental to the carrying out of the purpose for which it is constituted. I refrain from expressing any opinion whether or not the employees constitute a ' section of the public'. For, if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, any other object which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose, would not prevent the trust or the institution from being a valid charity. Likewise, cls. 3(z-1) and (z-2) which permit the establishment of a trust or trusts, appointment of trustees thereof from time to time and the vesting of funds or surplus income or any property of the assessee in the trustees, are nothing but powers conferred on them for the proper financial management of the affairs of the trust which are incidental or ancillary to the main purpose of the trust. The contention must, therefore, fail. In the result, the reference under s. 257 of the I.T. Act, 1961, made by the I.T. Appellate Tribunal, Delhi-B New Delhi, must be answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. VENKATARAMIAH J. - HELD THAT:- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother, A. P. Sen J., and I respectfully agree with his reasoning and conclusion. It is true that it is open to the Legislature to give encouragement to objects which it considers to be laudable by means of fiscal exemptions. At the same time it takes care to enact fresh provisions from time to time to suppress any mischief which may have resulted from the misuse of the existing law. Parliament deliberately stepped in by adding the words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit ' in the definition of charitable purpose in s. 2(15) of the Act, when the tax exemptions available to charitable and religious trusts came to be misused by some for the unworthy purposes of tax avoidance. The law had been so re-structured to prevent allergy to taxation masquerading as charity. The law was thus designed by Parliament to prevent this misuse of tax exemption in the name of charity. It is wrong to think that all springs of charity in India will dry up if true effect is given to s. 2(15) of the Act in accordance with the minority judgment in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association case. People who are truly charitable do not think of the tax benefits while making charities. One must realise that even the poor who do not pay income-tax can be charitable and their charities made at great personal inconvenience are commendable indeed. One need not go in search of charitable persons amongst the taxpayers only. Still the majority view has got to be followed now. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal questions referred for determination were:(i) Whether the assessee was liable to pay tax on income earned during the accounting year on the ground that such income was derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes within the meaning of section 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961;(ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the sole purpose of the Federation was the advancement of objects of general public utility which did not involve carrying on any activity for profit, thereby constituting a 'charitable purpose' within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961;(iii) Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in placing the onus on the revenue department to prove that the income claimed as exempt was in fact not exempt, and whether the department failed to discharge this onus;Additionally, the reference involved interpretation of the phrase 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit' in the definition of 'charitable purpose' under section 2(15), and its application to the activities of a company registered as a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue (i): Liability to pay tax on income derived from property held under trust for charitable or religious purposes under section 11(1)Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 11(1) exempts income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes to the extent such income is applied to those purposes in India. The definition of 'charitable purpose' is provided in section 2(15), which includes 'advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit'. The Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce (1965) had earlier held that the Federation's income was exempt under the corresponding earlier law.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the memorandum of association of the Federation, noting that the primary object was to promote Indian business and economic subjects, which is an object of general public utility. The Court considered the Federation's activities during the relevant year, including holding trade fairs, sponsoring conferences, and deriving income from rents, sale of tickets, arbitration fees, and government grants.The Court noted that although the Federation earned some income, the activities were carried out without the motive of earning profits, but rather to advance the main object of promoting trade and commerce. The Court also considered the provisions of the memorandum, including clauses restricting distribution of profits and requiring application of income solely towards the Federation's objects.Key evidence and findings: The Federation's income and expenditure account showed a small surplus. The Federation held trade fairs only twice in 25 years, and the income from these fairs and other activities was incidental to the dominant object. The Federation did not carry on business or trade in the commercial sense, nor did it have profit-making as its real object.Application of law to facts: Applying the definition of charitable purpose and the exemption provisions, the Court found that the Federation's income was derived from property held under trust for charitable purposes and was applied accordingly. The income was thus exempt under section 11(1).Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue argued that the Federation's activities involved carrying on of activities for profit, relying on the amended definition of charitable purpose including the phrase 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.' They contended that the Federation's income from exhibitions, arbitration fees, and sale of publications showed profit-making activities, disqualifying exemption. The Court rejected this, holding that incidental or ancillary profits do not disqualify exemption if profit-making is not the dominant object.Conclusion: The Court held that the Federation was not liable to pay tax on the income for the assessment year 1962-63, as the income was exempt under section 11(1) read with section 2(15).Issue (ii): Whether the Federation's purpose was advancement of objects of general public utility not involving carrying on any activity for profitRelevant legal framework and precedents: The definition of charitable purpose in section 2(15) was central, particularly the phrase 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.' The Court reviewed conflicting High Court decisions, including the Calcutta and Kerala High Courts, and prior Supreme Court decisions such as Loka Shikshana Trust and Indian Chamber of Commerce cases. The five-judge majority decision in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (1980) was especially significant, as it reversed earlier decisions and adopted the doctrine of dominant or primary object.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the phrase 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit' qualifies the word 'advancement' and not the phrase 'object of general public utility.' The majority view in the Surat Art Silk case was that if the dominant or primary object is charitable, incidental profit-making activities do not negate exemption. The Court emphasized the doctrine of dominant object, meaning that the real object must not be profit-making, even if some profit arises incidentally.Key evidence and findings: The Federation's memorandum of association showed the main objects were to promote Indian business and economic welfare, which are objects of general public utility. Subsidiary activities such as exhibitions, arbitration, and publication were incidental or ancillary to the main purpose. The Federation did not carry on business in the commercial sense, nor was profit the real object.Application of law to facts: Applying the dominant object doctrine, the Court found the Federation's activities were primarily charitable and for public utility, with no profit motive. The incidental profits did not disqualify exemption under section 2(15).Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue's argument that any profit-making activity disqualifies exemption was rejected. The Court held that the amendment to section 2(15) was intended to prevent misuse of charitable status for trading profit, but the dominant object test remains applicable. The Court also rejected reliance on punctuation and dictionary meanings that would impose a stricter interpretation.Conclusion: The Court upheld that the Federation's purpose was advancement of objects of general public utility not involving carrying on any activity for profit in the legal sense, entitling it to exemption.Issue (iii): Onus of proof regarding exemption and whether the revenue discharged its onusRelevant legal framework and precedents: The Court referred to the principle that exemption provisions are to be strictly construed against the claimant, but the burden of proof lies on the revenue to show that income is taxable. The Court cited earlier decisions and authoritative texts on statutory interpretation and tax law.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court recognized that while exemption claims must be clear and unambiguous, the revenue must prove that the income falls within the charging provisions. The Court found that the revenue failed to establish that the Federation's income was from profit-making activities or business in the commercial sense.Key evidence and findings: The revenue did not demonstrate that the Federation's activities were carried on with a profit motive or that the income was not applied to charitable purposes. The Tribunal and appellate authorities had found that the Federation's activities were charitable in nature.Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that the taxing provisions must be clear and that the revenue did not discharge its onus to prove that the exemption did not apply.Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue contended the onus was on the assessee to prove exemption, but the Court held that once exemption is claimed, the revenue must prove the contrary. The Court rejected the revenue's contention that the Federation's activities were commercial and profit-making.Conclusion: The Court held that the onus was on the revenue to prove that the income was not exempt, which it failed to discharge, and therefore the income was exempt.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGSThe Court, by majority, held:'If the profit must necessarily feed charitable purpose, under the terms of the trust, the mere fact that the activities of the trust yield profit will not alter the charitable character of the trust.'This statement encapsulates the core principle that incidental profit-making activities do not negate the charitable nature of an institution if the dominant object is charitable.The Court reaffirmed the doctrine of dominant or primary object as the determining factor in assessing exemption under section 2(15) and section 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.The Court held that the Federation's purpose was the advancement of objects of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit, entitling it to exemption under the Act for the assessment year 1962-63.It was held that the onus to prove that income claimed as exempt was in fact taxable lay on the revenue, which failed to discharge this onus.The Court also observed that the restrictive words 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit' govern the word 'advancement' and not the phrase 'object of general public utility,' thereby allowing incidental profit-making activities if the dominant object is charitable.A concurring but dissenting opinion expressed doubts about the correctness of the majority view, emphasizing that the legislative intent behind the restrictive clause was to prevent misuse of charitable exemptions for profit-making activities, and cautioning against judicial interpretations that neutralize such legislative intent.