1986 (9) TMI 405 - SC - Indian Laws

Statutory tenant can create valid license before February 1973 under section 15A Bombay Rent Act

The SC allowed the appeal and set aside the Bombay HC's judgment regarding a tenant's right to create a license under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. The court ... Scope of High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with findings of facts by appropriate authorities - written agreement of leave and licence entered into between the tenant, and the appellant herein in respect of the premises being the entire flat - suit for possession of the said premises on the ground of personal requirement, subletting and nonpayment of rent - Whether and how far a statutory tenant governed by Bombay Rent Act, 1947 could have created a valid licence before 1973? - HELD THAT:- The non-obstante clause clearly provided that a licensee in the circumstances mentioned in the section who was not a tenant, shall nevertheless be deemed to be a tenant. It is wrong to interpret, according to Shri Tarkunde, the non-obstante clause as if it validated a licence which was invalid. The non-obstante clause, according to counsel, did not say that notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary, a person who claimed to be a licensee should be deemed to be a licensee; what it says was that a person who was in fact a licensee would be deemed to be a tenant. The question is whether the appellant in the present case had a valid licence on 1st February, 1973 and that question which has to be determined independently of the nonobstante clause. If it was contended, it was found that the appellant was a licensee of the premises and was in occupation thereof on 1st February, 1973, then it would follow, notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary, that she should be deemed to be a tenant of the premises. Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Another v. Arabinda Bose & Another, [1952 (10) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT], and Dominion of India & Another v. Shribai A. Irani & Another, [1954 (5) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT] in support of the proposition that non-obstante clause was relevant to the operative part of the section. Therefore, as a result of the discussions, it appears that until a decree of eviction was passed against the tenant, the tenant could have created a licence and as in this case indisputably the licence was created before 1st February, 1973, the licensee must, by the express terms of section 15A of the Act, continue to be a tenant of the landlord in respect of the premises in question. In our opinion a tenant protected by a statute is entitled to create a licence. The licence is not an interest in property. It is purely a personal right. We must take notice of the fact of the various amendments in the Act introduced simultaneously with section 15A of the Act that the entire scheme of those amendments was to protect licensees. Shri Tarkunde tried to urge that right to create licence was coterminus with a right to transfer interest though licence itself was not a transfer. We are unable to accept this argument. The aims and objects of the amending Act was placed before us in support of the contention that it was to protect the interest of the licensees of the landlord that the provisions of section 15A were introduced. But the aims and objects as set out hereinbefore, do not warrant such a restricted meaning. Section 15A read with section 14(2) which was also introduced by Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973 simultaneously makes the position clear that where the interest of a licensor, who is a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, the licensee, who by section 15A is deemed to be a tenant, shall, subject to the provisions of the said Act be deemed to be a tenant of the landlord, on the terms and conditions of the agreement consistent with the provisions of the Act. If the view of the full bench of the Bombay High Court is to be given effect to, then it will defeat the purpose of the nonobstante clause in section 15A of the Act. The rule of construction is to give effect to the intention of the legislature and not to amend what is actually expressed where the language is plain and admits of one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. Here, in this case it is possible to give effect to the literal construction; nothing has been shown to warrant that such literal construction should not be given effect to. The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It was canvassed before us that the non-obstsnte clause was connected with the verb i.e. that a licensee in section 15A of the Act on the date be deemed to become tenant but it does not detract from the power of the tenant not to create licence. The construction placed by the full bench, in our opinion, would curtail the language of the section and on the basis of the High Court’s judgment, the amendment ceases to be meaningful for a large section intended to be protected and unless one is constrained by compulsion to give a restricted meaning, one should not do it in this case. We find no such compulsion. It is well settled that the expression ‘notwithstanding’ is in contradistinction to the phrase ’subject to’, the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made subject. This will be clarified in the instant case by comparison of sub-section (1) of section 15 with sub-section (1) of section 15A. We are therefore unable to accept, with respect, the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court as relied on by the learned single judge in the judgment under appeal. In the premises first the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the finding of facts made by the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore. Secondly, the High Court was in error on the construction of the provisions of section 15A of the said Act. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the judgment under appeal. In the premises it must be held that all licensees created by landlords or by the tenant before 1st February, 1973 and who were in actual occupation of a premises which was not less than a room as licensee on 1st February, 1973 would be the licensees of the landlord or tenant and whether there be any term in the original agreement for tenancy permitting creation of such tenancy ar licences or not they would become tenant and enjoy the rights granted under the Act specially those mentioned in section 14(2) of the Act. In the premises, in the facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned hereinbefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned single judge of the High Court of Bombay are set aside. In the facts of this case, however, we direct that the parties shall . Issues Involved:1. Scope of High Court's power under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with findings of facts by appropriate authorities.2. Validity of a licence created by a statutory tenant governed by the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, before 1973.Issue-wise Summary:1. Scope of High Court's Power under Article 227:The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could interfere with the factual findings of the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Court reiterated that the High Court could set aside findings of fact if there was no evidence to justify such conclusions or if the findings were perverse in law. The principle is well-settled that the High Court should not interfere unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice or a flagrant violation of law. The Court cited several precedents, including D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukharjee, Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, and Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ram Chandra Ganesh Bhide, to support this position. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the factual findings of the appellate bench, which had acted within its jurisdiction and had not misdirected itself on law or fact.2. Validity of Licence Created by a Statutory Tenant:The Supreme Court addressed whether a statutory tenant governed by the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, could create a valid licence before 1973. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had held that a statutory tenant could not create a valid licence unless the original contractual tenancy explicitly allowed it. The Supreme Court disagreed with this view, emphasizing that the statutory tenant's right to create a licence was not necessarily co-terminus with the right to transfer interest. The Court noted that the purpose of the amendment introducing Section 15A was to protect licensees in occupation on 1st February 1973, regardless of whether the tenant had a specific contractual right to create a licence. The Supreme Court held that all licensees created by landlords or tenants before 1st February 1973, who were in actual occupation of premises, would be deemed tenants under Section 15A, irrespective of the original tenancy agreement's terms.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and order of the learned single judge of the Bombay High Court. The Court held that the High Court had erred in interfering with the factual findings and in its interpretation of Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. The Court clarified that licensees in occupation on 1st February 1973 would be deemed tenants, enjoying the rights granted under the Act.