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Issues: (i) Whether a writ of habeas corpus was maintainable after the arrestee had been produced before the Magistrate and remanded by a reasoned judicial order; (ii) Whether Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permitted custody of the investigating agency beyond the first 15 days of remand.
Issue (i): Whether a writ of habeas corpus was maintainable after the arrestee had been produced before the Magistrate and remanded by a reasoned judicial order.
Analysis: Once the arrestee was forwarded to the Magistrate in compliance with the special statute, custody became judicial custody. A writ of habeas corpus lies only against illegal detention, not to bypass a judicial remand order passed with application of mind. Where the remand order is reasoned, the remedy lies by challenge to that order under the applicable statutory framework and not by habeas corpus, except in cases of demonstrable illegality in the arrest process itself.
Conclusion: The writ of habeas corpus was not maintainable, and the challenge to detention on that basis failed.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied to an arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permitted custody of the investigating agency beyond the first 15 days of remand.
Analysis: The special enactment contains its own arrest safeguards in Section 19 and its own procedural scheme, with Section 65 making the Code applicable only so far as it is not inconsistent. On that footing, Section 41A was held inapplicable to arrests under the special enactment. Reading Section 167 of the Code harmoniously with the special statute, the Court held that the Magistrate may authorise custody as the occasion arises during the period of investigation and that the expression "such custody" is not confined to the first 15 days in the narrow sense urged by the appellants. The Court also held that physical custody had not yet been taken by the respondents because the arrestee remained in hospital under judicial orders, and the period affected by those orders could not defeat the investigating agency's entitlement.
Conclusion: Section 41A had no application to the arrest under the special enactment, and the respondents' position on custody and exclusion of time was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the legality of the detention and remand failed, while the investigating agency's entitlement to custody for the remaining period within the statutory limit was recognised.
Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, habeas corpus is not the proper remedy against a reasoned judicial remand order, Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not apply to such arrests, and Section 167 of the Code is to be read with the special statute so that custody may be authorised in aid of investigation in accordance with law.