Written grounds of arrest were not extended to UAPA arrests, and the remand challenge failed on the record.

Pankaj Bansal was held not to extend to arrests under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, because that statute operates under a materially different scheme from the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act and does not impose an equivalent written-grounds mandate, although Article 22(1) still applies. The Court further found that the record reflected communication of arrest-related material and participation of counsel at remand, so the alleged non-communication of grounds and denial of effective representation did not vitiate the arrest or remand proceedings. No constitutional or statutory infirmity warranting interference was made out.

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Issues: (i) Whether the rule in Pankaj Bansal, requiring written communication of grounds of arrest, applied to arrests under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. (ii) Whether the arrest and remand proceedings were vitiated for non-communication of grounds of arrest and denial of effective legal representation.

Issue (i): Whether the rule in Pankaj Bansal, requiring written communication of grounds of arrest, applied to arrests under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was held to be materially different from the scheme under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The former contains a requirement of recorded reasons in writing and a distinct compliance structure, whereas the latter does not impose an equivalent mandate for furnishing written grounds of arrest. The constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) remains, but the Court held that the ratio in Pankaj Bansal could not be transplanted into the UAPA context, particularly having regard to the different statutory purpose and the national security dimension of UAPA proceedings.

Conclusion: The rule in Pankaj Bansal was held not applicable to arrests under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the challenge on that basis failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the arrest and remand proceedings were vitiated for non-communication of grounds of arrest and denial of effective legal representation.

Analysis: The Court found inconsistencies and gaps in the petitioner's factual account and noted that the record reflected communication of the arrest-related material and participation of counsel in the remand process. The remand application was furnished, counsel was heard, and the pleadings did not convincingly establish that there was no representation or that the remand order was passed in a manner rendering it illegal. The Court also held that the materials did not justify interference on the basis of the alleged disability or the asserted procedural infirmities.

Conclusion: The arrest and remand proceedings were held not to be vitiated, and the challenge was rejected.

Final Conclusion: No constitutional or statutory infirmity warranting interference was made out, and the petitions were dismissed.

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