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Issues: (i) Whether a writ of habeas corpus is maintainable after a judicial order of remand, and in what circumstances; (ii) Whether the arrest and remand of the detenu under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from illegality for alleged non-compliance with Article 22(1), Sections 41 and 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (iii) Whether the Enforcement Directorate could seek custody under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and whether the period during which the detenu remained hospitalised could be excluded for computing the first 15 days of custody.
Issue (i): Whether a writ of habeas corpus is maintainable after a judicial order of remand, and in what circumstances.
Analysis: One opinion held that habeas corpus may still lie where the remand order is illegal, mechanical, or passed without application of mind, especially where the initial arrest is alleged to violate constitutional safeguards. The other opinion held that once a competent court has passed a valid judicial remand order, the detention is ordinarily lawful and habeas corpus will not lie, save in cases of absolute illegality, lack of jurisdiction, or total non-application of mind.
Conclusion: The opinions diverged on the maintainability question.
Issue (ii): Whether the arrest and remand of the detenu under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 suffered from illegality for alleged non-compliance with Article 22(1), Sections 41 and 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: One opinion held that the grounds of arrest were not properly communicated, that the arrest procedure was vitiated, and that Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was attracted in the facts. The other opinion held that Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 contains the governing arrest procedure, that the detenu was informed of the grounds of arrest, and that the statutory and constitutional safeguards were substantially complied with.
Conclusion: The opinions diverged on whether the arrest and remand were legally infirm.
Issue (iii): Whether the Enforcement Directorate could seek custody under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and whether the period during which the detenu remained hospitalised could be excluded for computing the first 15 days of custody.
Analysis: One opinion held that the Enforcement Directorate was not empowered to seek police custody under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and that the first 15 days rule could not be displaced. The other opinion held that Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies to proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, that custody may be sought by the investigating agency, and that the period during which the detenu was medically unfit for interrogation could be excluded for computing the initial custody period.
Conclusion: The opinions diverged on custody and exclusion of time.
Final Conclusion: The case was finally disposed of, but the judges delivered conflicting conclusions on the central issues, resulting in no clear majority on the core legal questions.