PMLA investigation powers upheld: ECIR, summons, Section 50 statements, and corruption proceedings against a private person survived challenge.

An internal ECIR under the PMLA cannot be quashed merely on apprehension of repetition where the predicate offences and alleged conspiracy are distinct; the challenge was therefore rejected as premature. Summons issued as part of PMLA investigation and the sharing of material under Section 66(2) were treated as lawful investigative steps, so pre-trial interference was declined. Statements recorded under Section 50 were not quashed because the person was not formally arraigned as an accused when they were taken, and Article 20(3) protections and Section 164(4) CrPC safeguards were held inapplicable at that stage. A private person may also face proceedings for abetment or conspiracy under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the Enforcement Case Information Report and the connected proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the later ECIR was a parallel or repetitive investigation arising from the same facts; (ii) whether the summons issued under the PMLA and the communication of material under Section 66(2) of the PMLA could be interfered with; (iii) whether the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA were liable to be quashed for want of safeguards against self-incrimination; and (iv) whether the petitioner, being a private and not a public servant, could resist the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Issue (i): whether the Enforcement Case Information Report and the connected proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the later ECIR was a parallel or repetitive investigation arising from the same facts.

Analysis: The challenge to the later ECIR was held to be premature and unsustainable because an ECIR is an internal document without statutory basis, unlike an FIR. The Court held that, absent a challenge to the predicate offences and in the absence of the ECIR being placed in public domain with demonstrable sameness, it could not be quashed merely on apprehension. The Court also accepted the distinction between the earlier and later predicate offences, noting the allegation of a larger conspiracy and relying on the settled principle that multiple FIRs are permissible where the incidents, offences, or conspiracy angles are distinct.

Conclusion: The challenge to the ECIR and the plea that it amounted to evergreening or parallel investigation failed and was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the summons issued under the PMLA and the communication of material under Section 66(2) of the PMLA could be interfered with.

Analysis: The Court held that the power to summon under Section 50 of the PMLA forms part of the investigative machinery and cannot ordinarily be interdicted in writ jurisdiction at a pre-trial stage. It further held that Section 66(2) casts a duty on the Enforcement Directorate to share material with the competent law-enforcement agency where cognizable offences emerge, and that registration of an FIR on such information is a legally recognised consequence. The prayer to restrain further coercive action was therefore treated as premature and unsupported by any illegality in the statutory exercise of power.

Conclusion: The challenge to the summons and to the forwarding of information under Section 66(2) failed and was rejected.

Issue (iii): whether the statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA were liable to be quashed for want of safeguards against self-incrimination.

Analysis: The Court held that the petitioner had not been formally arraigned as an accused when the statements were recorded, and therefore the protections under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and the safeguards applicable to confession of an accused under Section 164(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were not attracted. It further held that the special scheme of the PMLA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not import Miranda-style warnings or the full procedural regime applicable to police confessions into Section 50 statements. The belated retraction was also not treated as a basis for quashing at this stage.

Conclusion: The request to quash the recorded statements was rejected.

Issue (iv): whether the petitioner, being a private person and not a public servant, could resist the proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: The Court held that a private person can be proceeded against for aiding, abetting, or conspiring in offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, even if not himself a public servant. The alleged role attributed to the petitioner, as reflected in the larger conspiracy allegations, was therefore not a legal bar to the proceedings.

Conclusion: The objection based on the petitioner's status as a private person was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was found to be devoid of merit. The Court declined to interfere with the impugned ECIR, the summons, the recorded statements, or the inter-agency communication, and left the parties to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An internal ECIR under the PMLA cannot be quashed on mere apprehension of repetition when the predicate offences and alleged conspiracy are distinct, and statements recorded under Section 50 before formal arraignment as an accused do not attract the protections applicable to accused-person confessions under Article 20(3) or Section 164(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

---