GST input tax credit remains subject to statutory time limits; belated returns with late fee do not revive barred credit claims.

Input tax credit under GST is a statutory concession and must be claimed strictly within the conditions and time limit prescribed by section 16(4). The Court held that this limitation is not unconstitutional under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 300-A, and that section 16(2) does not override section 16(4) because the provisions operate in different fields. Acceptance of belated GSTR-3B returns with late fee does not extend or waive the statutory cut-off for availing credit. The challenge based on absence of proper notice or hearing also failed, as the objections were considered and rejected.

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Issues: (i) Whether the time limit under section 16(4) of the APGST Act, 2017 and the CGST Act, 2017 for claiming input tax credit is unconstitutional; (ii) whether section 16(2) overrides section 16(4) so as to neutralise the limitation for availing input tax credit; (iii) whether acceptance of belated GSTR-3B returns with late fee removes the bar under section 16(4); and (iv) whether the assessment order was vitiated for want of proper show cause notice and opportunity of hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the time limit under section 16(4) of the APGST Act, 2017 and the CGST Act, 2017 for claiming input tax credit is unconstitutional.

Analysis: Input tax credit is treated as a statutory concession or benefit available only within the scheme of the GST enactments. The Court applied the principle that conditions attached to a concession must be strictly complied with, and that in fiscal legislation the legislature has wide latitude to prescribe time limits. The time restriction in section 16(4) was found to be a legislative condition on availment of the benefit and not an arbitrary deprivation of property or of the freedom to trade.

Conclusion: The time limit under section 16(4) is not violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 300-A of the Constitution of India.

Issue (ii): Whether section 16(2) overrides section 16(4) so as to neutralise the limitation for availing input tax credit.

Analysis: The non obstante clause in section 16(2) was read in its statutory context. The Court held that section 16(1) is the enabling provision, section 16(2) lays down eligibility conditions, and section 16(4) separately imposes a time restriction. Since both provisions operate in different fields and are not inconsistent, the non obstante clause in section 16(2) does not displace section 16(4).

Conclusion: Section 16(2) does not override section 16(4) and both provisions operate independently.

Issue (iii): Whether acceptance of belated GSTR-3B returns with late fee removes the bar under section 16(4).

Analysis: Payment of late fee only regularises delayed filing of returns for assessment purposes. It does not confer a right to claim input tax credit beyond the statutory cut-off. The acceptance of the return with late fee therefore does not extend or waive the time limit for availing credit under section 16(4).

Conclusion: Mere acceptance of belated GSTR-3B returns with late fee does not exonerate the delay in claiming input tax credit beyond section 16(4).

Issue (iv): Whether the assessment order was vitiated for want of proper show cause notice and opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned order showed that the objections raised by the petitioner were considered and rejected, and that the procedural safeguards complained of had in substance been afforded. The Court found no merit in the challenge based on alleged absence of notice or hearing.

Conclusion: The assessment order was not vitiated on the ground of absence of proper notice or opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the limitation on input tax credit and to the impugned assessment order failed, and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit under GST is a statutory concession subject to strict compliance with eligibility conditions and statutory time limits; a non obstante clause within the eligibility provision does not override a separate limitation provision unless there is a clear inconsistency.

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