Special empowerment under anti-trafficking law can validly arise through notification to a class of Magistrates by office.

The expression "specially empowered" in section 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was construed as referring to empowerment for a special purpose, not to the individual mode of selection of the Magistrate. A notification empowering all Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to act under the Act was therefore sufficient, because the statutory object required a practical construction that advanced the smooth working of the special enforcement scheme. The Court held that empowerment by virtue of office through a valid notification validly conferred jurisdiction to try offences under the Act.

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Issues: Whether the expression "specially empowered" in section 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 requires empowerment of a Magistrate only by selection of particular individuals by name or office, or whether a notification empowering all Magistrates of the First Class for the statutory purpose is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to try offences under the Act.

Analysis: The expression "specially empowered" was construed in the context of the object of the Act, which creates special offences and entrusts their enforcement to special machinery. A restrictive reading tying the word "specially" to the mode of selection of the person empowered was held to be artificial and inconsistent with the statutory purpose. The word qualifies the empowerment, not the person, and signifies empowerment for a special purpose. The reasoning was reinforced by earlier decisions where empowerment by virtue of office was treated as sufficient, and by the principle that where two constructions are possible, the one that advances the object and smooth working of the statute should be preferred.

Conclusion: A notification empowering all Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to exercise jurisdiction under the Act validly makes them "specially empowered" within section 2(c), and such Magistrates have jurisdiction to try offences under the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: For a statute conferring jurisdiction on a "specially empowered" Magistrate for a special purpose, empowerment by a valid government notification addressed to the class of Magistrates by virtue of office is sufficient; the term "specially" relates to the purpose of the empowerment and not to individual selection of the person empowered.

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