Certiorari review of excise authorities is limited to jurisdictional error, not reappreciation of facts or substitute choice.

Excise appellate and revisional authorities were treated as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity where the statutory scheme required them to decide rival claims for settlement within a hierarchy of appeal and revision, so their orders were amenable to judicial review. However, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction could not be used to reappreciate evidence, correct mere factual errors, or substitute the High Court's choice for that of the statutory authority; interference was confined to jurisdictional error or an error of law apparent on the face of the record. On the special facts, limited interference with an interlocutory possession order was justified to prevent an unlawful state of affairs.

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Issues: (i) whether the excise appellate and revisional authorities under the Excise Act exercised purely administrative power or functions of a quasi-judicial character amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; (ii) whether the High Court could quash the authorities' orders on the ground that they exceeded jurisdiction, violated natural justice, or suffered from error apparent on the face of the record; and (iii) whether the High Court could interfere with the interlocutory order relating to possession in the pending proceedings.

Issue (i): whether the excise appellate and revisional authorities under the Excise Act exercised purely administrative power or functions of a quasi-judicial character amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

Analysis: The statutory scheme created a hierarchy of authorities with a right of appeal and revision, ending in the appellate authority whose decision was final. The provisions and rules required the authorities to choose between rival tenderers and to decide disputes affecting rights to settlement, which meant that the authorities were not acting as mere administrative bodies in the narrow sense. Even though the statute did not expressly prescribe a formal procedure, the nature of the power and the existence of a lis between competing claimants required the authorities to act judicially or quasi-judicially, within the limits of the statute and rules.

Conclusion: The authorities were amenable to judicial review, but the scope of such review depended on whether they acted within statutory limits and according to law.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court could quash the authorities' orders on the ground that they exceeded jurisdiction, violated natural justice, or suffered from error apparent on the face of the record

Analysis: The supervisory jurisdiction under certiorari is not an appellate jurisdiction. It is confined to correcting jurisdictional defects and errors of law apparent on the face of the record, and does not extend to reappreciation of evidence, correction of mere errors of fact, or substitution of the High Court's own choice for that of the statutory appellate authority. The rules did not impose mandatory procedures whose breach could be treated as a denial of natural justice in the circumstances. The appellate authority had plenary power to reconsider the matter and make its own selection, and the High Court erred in treating alleged factual mistakes, inferences, or non-observance of executive instructions as grounds for certiorari.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in setting aside the orders on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction, natural justice, or error apparent on the face of the record.

Issue (iii): whether the High Court could interfere with the interlocutory order relating to possession in the pending proceedings

Analysis: The possession dispute arose from an erroneous understanding of the High Court's interim direction maintaining status quo ante. The result was an unjustified dispossession of the party who had been put in possession pursuant to the statutory orders. In the exceptional circumstances of the case, intervention was required to prevent the continuance of an unlawful state of affairs pending the writ proceedings.

Conclusion: Interference with the interlocutory order was warranted in the special facts of the case.

Final Conclusion: The statutory authorities' orders were within jurisdiction and the High Court had gone beyond the permissible limits of certiorari and supervisory review; accordingly, the appeals succeeded and the High Court's orders were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Judicial review under certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction cannot be used to reappreciate facts or substitute the court's own choice for that of a statutory authority acting within its lawful discretion; interference lies only for jurisdictional error or an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

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