Statutory appeal limits Article 226 interim release where confiscation is unchallenged; tribunal may grant interim protection instead.

Where an efficacious statutory appeal exists against confiscation, the High Court should not grant interim release of goods under Article 226 without first testing the confiscation order, because such relief would bypass the appellate scheme and may render the appeal infructuous. The Tribunal, however, can pass appropriate interlocutory orders, including release of goods, under its appellate powers and procedural rules to secure the ends of justice and protect revenue interests. Earlier single-Judge and Division Bench orders granting interim relief were not binding precedent on this point because they did not decide the legal issue. The writ order was therefore set aside and interim relief was left to the appellate forum.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in the presence of an efficacious statutory appeal, the High Court could grant interim release of confiscated goods under Article 226 without examining the validity of the confiscation order. (ii) Whether the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal had power to pass interim orders, including release of goods, pending appeal. (iii) Whether earlier single-Judge and Division Bench orders granting such relief could be treated as binding precedent.

Issue (i): Whether, in the presence of an efficacious statutory appeal, the High Court could grant interim release of confiscated goods under Article 226 without examining the validity of the confiscation order.

Analysis: The order of confiscation was appealable to the Tribunal, which could confirm, modify, annul, or remand the decision. The writ petition did not challenge the merits of the confiscation order but sought release of the goods by way of interim mandamus. Granting such relief would bypass the statutory appellate remedy and could defeat the confiscation order by allowing disposal of the goods before adjudication of the appeal. Interim jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be exercised in a manner that circumvents the statutory scheme or renders the proceedings infructuous.

Conclusion: The High Court could not properly grant the interim release order under Article 226 in these circumstances.

Issue (ii): Whether the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal had power to pass interim orders, including release of goods, pending appeal.

Analysis: The appellate power under Section 129B of the Customs Act, together with Rule 41 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982, was read as wide enough to include interlocutory directions necessary to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process. The Tribunal could make appropriate interim arrangements in aid of the appeal, while safeguarding revenue interests and ensuring availability of goods where confiscation might ultimately be upheld.

Conclusion: The Tribunal did have power to pass appropriate interim orders, including release of goods, in a proper case.

Issue (iii): Whether earlier single-Judge and Division Bench orders granting such relief could be treated as binding precedent.

Analysis: The earlier orders did not decide the legal question whether the High Court could grant such relief without adjudicating the confiscation order. They merely made interim arrangements on the facts of those cases. Since the legal issue was not substantively decided, those orders could not be treated as laying down a binding rule contrary to the statutory scheme and the governing Supreme Court authority.

Conclusion: The earlier orders were not binding precedent on the point.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the writ order was set aside, and the parties were left to seek appropriate interim relief before the appellate tribunal under the statutory framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory appeal exists, the High Court should not grant interim relief that effectively neutralises a confiscation order without adjudicating its validity; interim protection must ordinarily be sought from the appellate forum empowered to make interlocutory orders in aid of the appeal.

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