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Issues: (i) Whether the borrower's suit for damages and the Bank's recovery application were inextricably connected. (ii) Whether the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 required transfer of an independent suit filed by a borrower against a bank to the Tribunal as a counter-claim in the bank's recovery application. (iii) Whether the observation in earlier authority permitting such transfer was a binding declaration of law or was confined to the special facts of that case.
Issue (i): Whether the borrower's suit for damages and the Bank's recovery application were inextricably connected.
Analysis: The Bank's claim before the Tribunal arose from alleged non-payment of amounts advanced under ad hoc packing credit facilities, whereas the borrower's suit arose from the Bank's alleged failure to release later sanctioned credit facilities, causing claimed loss and damages. The causes of action, issues, and reliefs were materially different. One proceeding concerned recovery of an ascertained debt, while the other required proof of breach and assessment of damages. There was no legal or factual interdependence such that the result in one would control the other.
Conclusion: The two proceedings were not inextricably connected.
Issue (ii): Whether the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 required transfer of an independent suit filed by a borrower against a bank to the Tribunal as a counter-claim in the bank's recovery application.
Analysis: The Act bars civil court jurisdiction only in respect of recovery applications by banks and financial institutions. It does not bar a borrower's independent civil suit against a bank. Section 31 provides transfer only of pending recovery suits or proceedings of the kind contemplated by the Act, and does not cover a suit instituted by a borrower after the Tribunal's establishment. The counter-claim and set-off provisions in Section 19 are enabling provisions applicable in a pending bank application; they do not compel a borrower to surrender an independent suit or authorize transfer of such a suit against the borrower's wish. The High Court therefore retained jurisdiction over the borrower's suit.
Conclusion: Transfer of the borrower's independent suit was not mandated and the High Court's jurisdiction continued.
Issue (iii): Whether the observation in earlier authority permitting such transfer was a binding declaration of law or was confined to the special facts of that case.
Analysis: The earlier authority was decided in a different factual setting involving suits found to be inextricably connected and dealt with in a context where the parties' positions and the procedural posture were materially different. The present judgment clarifies that any extension of that observation can operate only where the suits are truly inextricably connected and both parties agree to have the independent suit treated as a counter-claim for joint disposal. Outside those limits, the earlier observation cannot be treated as a general rule requiring transfer of every borrower's suit.
Conclusion: The earlier observation was distinguishable and not a universal mandate for transfer.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the borrower's suit remained an independent civil action outside the Tribunal's compulsory transfer regime, and the High Court's refusal to transfer it was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: An independent suit by a borrower against a bank cannot be compelled to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal as a counter-claim unless the causes of action are truly inextricably connected and both parties consent to joint disposal within the statutory framework.