Inherent powers for temporary injunctions are exceptional and cannot override the Code's specific procedural scheme.

Section 151 inherent power was held available to grant a temporary injunction in exceptional cases not expressly covered by Order XXXIX, but only where no express provision of the Code applies and the order does not conflict with its scheme. On the facts, an injunction restraining proceedings in an earlier suit before a competent court was unjustified because the Code supplied specific mechanisms, including Sections 10 and 22, and a contractual forum clause or inconvenience alone did not warrant indirect interference under Section 151. The restraint order was set aside.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a civil court can grant a temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers where the case does not fall within Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (ii) Whether an injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a previously instituted suit in another competent court was justified on the facts.

Issue (i): Whether a civil court can grant a temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers where the case does not fall within Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The majority held that the inherent power saved by Section 151 of the Code is available to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process, and is not taken away merely because Order XXXIX prescribes the ordinary cases in which temporary injunctions may be granted. The Code was treated as non-exhaustive, but the inherent power was described as exceptional and to be used only where no express provision of the Code applies or where its exercise does not conflict with the legislative scheme.

Conclusion: Yes. The court had inherent jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction in a case not strictly covered by Order XXXIX, though only in exceptional circumstances and without conflicting with the Code.

Issue (ii): Whether an injunction restraining a party from proceeding with a previously instituted suit in another competent court was justified on the facts.

Analysis: The majority held that the restraint order was not warranted. The earlier suit had been filed in a court competent to entertain it, the question of jurisdiction under the dissolution deed was already pending in the suits, and the Code provided specific mechanisms such as Section 10 for a subsequent suit and Section 22 for transfer where appropriate. The mere existence of a contractual forum clause, or the inconvenience caused by the choice of forum, did not justify using Section 151 to control proceedings in another court. The restraint order was therefore not necessary for the ends of justice and amounted to an improper indirect interference with the conduct of the earlier suit.

Conclusion: No. The injunction could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The restraint order was set aside and the appeal succeeded because the use of inherent powers on the facts was unjustified.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent powers under Section 151 may be used only in exceptional cases and cannot be invoked to override the specific procedural scheme of the Code where that scheme adequately governs the situation.

---