SARFAESI appeal delay can be condoned under incorporated recovery procedure; Limitation Act is not independently controlling

SARFAESI appellate procedure incorporates the Recovery of Debts Act framework through Section 18(2), so the Appellate Tribunal may condone delay in an appeal under Section 18(1) on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso to Section 20(3). The shorter limitation period in Section 18(1) does not itself negate that incorporated power. The Limitation Act is not independently attracted to create condonation power in these appeals, because the special scheme supplies its own mechanism, though Section 14-type exclusion principles may still apply where legally available.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has the power to condone delay in an appeal under Section 18(1) by applying Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 through Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. (ii) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 stands excluded, wholly or to any extent, in relation to such appeals under the SARFAESI Act.

Issue (i): Whether the Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has the power to condone delay in an appeal under Section 18(1) by applying Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 through Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Section 18(2) directs the Appellate Tribunal to dispose of appeals in accordance with the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made under, and this incorporates the appellate procedure of that Act into SARFAESI appeals. The proviso to Section 20(3) expressly authorises condonation of delay on sufficient cause being shown. Reading Section 18(2) with that proviso avoids defeating the incorporated procedure and gives effect to the legislative scheme. The shorter limitation period in Section 18(1) does not, by itself, negate the incorporated power to condone delay.

Conclusion: Yes. The Appellate Tribunal can condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act by virtue of Section 18(2) read with the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Issue (ii): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 stands excluded, wholly or to any extent, in relation to such appeals under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: The special statute contains its own appellate scheme and expressly incorporates the recovery legislation for disposal of appeals, while the Limitation Act is expressly referred to only for measures under Section 13(4). In that setting, Section 29(2) does not operate as an independent source of power where the special scheme itself supplies the condonation mechanism, and the Limitation Act stands impliedly excluded to that extent. At the same time, the Court accepted that principles akin to Section 14 may still apply where legally available.

Conclusion: The Limitation Act is not independently attracted to create the power of condonation in these appeals, though the incorporated statutory scheme itself permits condonation and Section 14-type exclusion principles may still apply where appropriate.

Final Conclusion: The governing rule is that SARFAESI appeals may be entertained beyond the prescribed period when sufficient cause is shown under the incorporated appellate procedure, and the contrary view denying such power was disapproved.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute incorporates the appellate procedure of another enactment, an expressly provided power to entertain delayed appeals in the incorporated provision applies to the special statute unless the legislative scheme expressly or by necessary implication excludes it.

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