Arbitration jurisdiction depends on statute, not supervisory control; retained seisin does not make the Supreme Court the first-instance court.

Jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940 is determined by the statute, not by the Supreme Court's earlier appointment of the arbitrator or retention of seisin. The Court clarified that such supervisory control does not create original jurisdiction to receive or challenge the arbitral award, because the award must be filed before the court competent under the Act and vested appellate rights cannot be curtailed without express legislative authority. Earlier decisions treating retained control as conferring exclusive jurisdiction were held inconsistent with the statutory scheme and overruled. The resulting position is that post-award objections must be pursued before the competent civil court.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court could entertain an application for making the arbitral award a rule of the Court merely because it had earlier appointed the arbitrator, issued directions, and retained seisin over the arbitration proceedings; (ii) Whether the earlier decisions holding that such control conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court stated the correct law.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court could entertain an application for making the arbitral award a rule of the Court merely because it had earlier appointed the arbitrator, issued directions, and retained seisin over the arbitration proceedings.

Analysis: The definition of "Court" in Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is controlled by the statutory context and does not enlarge jurisdiction by implication. Section 14(2) contemplates filing of the award in the court having jurisdiction under the Act, and Section 31(4) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the court competent to entertain the first application in the reference. Retention of control by the Supreme Court in a particular matter does not by itself create original jurisdiction, because jurisdiction must be conferred by law. The statutory scheme also preserves the litigant's vested right of appeal, which cannot be extinguished merely by procedural directions of a superior court.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court could not assume original jurisdiction to entertain objections to the award solely on the ground that it had retained control over the arbitration proceedings. The proper forum remained the court competent under the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier decisions holding that such control conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court stated the correct law.

Analysis: The reasoning in the earlier cases rested on an overextended analogy from decisions construing the expression "Court" in different statutory settings. That analogy did not support the proposition that the Supreme Court becomes the court of first instance for post-award proceedings merely because it had issued directions in the arbitration. The interpretation placed on Section 31(4) and the notion that the superior court could receive the award directly on the basis of retained control was found inconsistent with the statutory text, the scheme of the 1940 Act, and the settled principle that appellate rights can be taken away only by express legislative mandate.

Conclusion: The earlier decisions were held to be incorrect and were overruled, along with any other decisions following them.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the objections to the award were directed to be pursued before the competent civil court, and the legal position was clarified that the Supreme Court does not acquire original jurisdiction in arbitration matters merely by retaining supervisory control.

Ratio Decidendi: Jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940 is determined by the statute and not by supervisory control exercised by the Supreme Court; therefore, retention of seisin does not convert the Supreme Court into the court of first instance for filing and challenging the award, and vested appellate rights cannot be curtailed without express legal authority.

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