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Issues: (i) whether the expression "court" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an exhaustive definition confined to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction; (ii) whether Section 42 applies to applications under Part I of the Act, including applications under Sections 9 and 34, and to applications made after the arbitral proceedings have concluded; (iii) whether the Supreme Court can be treated as a "court" for the purposes of Section 2(1)(e) and Section 42, and whether an application made in a court lacking jurisdiction can attract Section 42.
Issue (i): whether the expression "court" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is an exhaustive definition confined to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Analysis: Section 2(1)(e) uses the words "means and includes", indicating an exhaustive definition. The provision identifies only two possible fora as "court" for Part I of the Act, namely the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The definition excludes courts of inferior grade and small causes courts. The scheme of the Act shows that the legislature intended the superior court with original civil jurisdiction to exercise control over arbitration-related applications that are cognisable by a "court" under the Act.
Conclusion: Yes. Section 2(1)(e) is exhaustive and confines "court" to the specified Principal Civil Court or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
Issue (ii): whether Section 42 applies to applications under Part I of the Act, including applications under Sections 9 and 34, and to applications made after the arbitral proceedings have concluded.
Analysis: Section 42 begins with a non-obstante clause and uses the wider phrase "with respect to an arbitration agreement", which covers applications before, during, and after arbitral proceedings. Applications under Section 9 are made to a "court" and therefore fall within Section 42. Applications under Section 34 to set aside an award are also within Section 42. By contrast, applications under Section 8 are made to a judicial authority and applications under Section 11 are made to the Chief Justice or his designate, who are not "court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e), and therefore those applications are outside Section 42. The statutory scheme excludes forum conveniens and fastens jurisdiction on the first competent court approached under Part I.
Conclusion: Yes, Section 42 applies to Section 9 and Section 34 applications and extends to post-award applications made under Part I, but it does not apply to Section 8 or Section 11 applications.
Issue (iii): whether the Supreme Court can be treated as a "court" for the purposes of Section 2(1)(e) and Section 42, and whether an application made in a court lacking jurisdiction can attract Section 42.
Analysis: Under the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court is not included within the exhaustive definition of "court" in Section 2(1)(e). The earlier decisions under the 1940 Act did not govern the new definition, and the statutory context under the 1996 Act does not permit the Supreme Court to be treated as a "court" for Section 42. If the first application is made to a forum that is not a court as defined, or to a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, Section 42 does not get attracted.
Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court cannot be treated as "court" for Section 2(1)(e) or Section 42, and an application made to a forum without jurisdiction does not trigger Section 42.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that jurisdiction under the 1996 Act is confined to the statutorily defined court, that Section 42 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the first competent court approached under Part I, and that the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction on the facts, so the challenge to the order could not succeed.
Ratio Decidendi: For Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, "court" is exhaustively confined to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, and Section 42 confers exclusive jurisdiction only when the first application under Part I is made to such a competent court.
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