1957 (2) TMI 54 - SC - Indian Laws

Vested Right to Appeal Preserved under Constitution

The majority of the Court held that the petitioner had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court (now the Supreme Court) under the law prevailing at ... Vested right of appeal - appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 133 and 135 - effect of constitutional replacement of appellate forum on pre-existing rights - non retroactivity of constitutional provisions - preservation of pre existing rights by adaptation orders - exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 by way of special leaveVested right of appeal - effect of subsequent statute on vested appellate rights - Whether a litigant who instituted a civil suit before the commencement of the Constitution had a vested right of appeal governed by the law in force at the date of institution - HELD THAT: - The Court reviewed the long line of authority beginning with Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving and subsequent Indian decisions, and distilled the prevailing principles: the legal pursuit of remedy (suit and its successive appeals) is an integrated proceeding; the right of appeal is substantive; such rights, when vested on the date of institution of proceedings, are governed by the law then in force and cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. Applying these principles to the suit instituted on April 22, 1949, the majority held that the parties acquired, on that date, the right (if unsuccessful) to appeal under the pre Constitutional law, including the right to appeal to the Federal Court (now replaced by the Supreme Court) subject to the conditions of the old Code and Letters Patent.The Court held that the petitioner had a vested right of appeal as of the date of institution of the suit and that that right is governed by the law prevailing on that date.Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 133 and 135 - non retroactivity of constitutional provisions - Whether the right of appeal in suits instituted before the Constitution but decided after its commencement is governed by Article 133 or is saved and governed by Article 135 - HELD THAT: - The Court analysed the text and purpose of Arts. 133 and 135, the Adaptation Order (ss. 109-110 as adapted) and clause 20 preserving pre existing rights. The majority concluded that Art. 133 does not operate so as to extinguish vested pre Constitution appellate rights arising from suits instituted before the Constitution; where a vested right of appeal existed and the Federal Court had jurisdiction immediately before the Constitution, Art. 135 preserves that jurisdiction (the Supreme Court standing in place of the Federal Court). The majority rejected the construction that Art. 133 should be read so as to apply to all High Court judgments delivered after the Constitution irrespective of the date of institution, because such a construction would have retrospective effect and destroy vested rights without express provision. The minority (dissent) took the contrary view, holding Art. 133 prospective and applicable to all judgments delivered after the Constitution, thereby excluding Art. 135 in the present case.The majority held that appeals arising from suits instituted before the Constitution (and vested under pre Constitution law) fall within Article 135, not to be defeated by Article 133, so that the pre existing right of appeal is preserved and exercisable to the Supreme Court.Preservation of pre existing rights by adaptation orders - effect of abolition of appellate forum - Whether the Adaptation Order and related constitutional provisions preserved the pre existing right of appeal and whether abolition of the Federal Court defeated that right - HELD THAT: - The Court examined Art. 372, the Adaptation of Laws Order (including clause 20), and Arts. 374 and 135. It held that the Adaptation Order preserved existing laws and rights for the purpose of enforcing vested pre Constitution rights. The abolition of the Federal Court by the Constitution did not deprive litigants of vested appellate rights where the Constitution itself (notably Art. 135 and Art. 374(2)) provided for transfer/substitution of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court; hence the machinery for enforcement of vested appellate rights continued under the Constitution.The Court held that the Adaptation Order and constitutional provisions preserved vested pre Constitution appellate rights and that the Supreme Court succeeds to the Federal Court's powers for such matters.Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 by way of special leave - Whether, on the facts, special leave under Article 136 should be granted to permit the petitioner to appeal to this Court - HELD THAT: - Having concluded that the petitioner had a vested right of appeal which was wrongly denied by the High Court, and that the matter fell within Article 135, the majority exercised the discretionary power under Article 136 to grant special leave to appeal. The Court observed that the High Court erred in refusing leave and that, in the circumstances, the petitioner should be permitted to prosecute his appeal to this Court.Special leave to appeal was granted by the Court under Article 136; the petitioner was awarded costs of the application against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and a stay was directed as prayed.Final Conclusion: The majority held that the petitioner, whose suit was instituted before the Constitution, possessed a vested right of appeal governed by the pre Constitution law, that Article 135 preserved jurisdiction in respect of such vested rights (the Supreme Court standing in place of the Federal Court), that the High Court erred in refusing leave, and accordingly special leave to appeal to this Court was granted; one judge dissented, taking the view that Article 133 governed judgments delivered after the Constitution and that the appeal was incompetent for want of the requisite valuation. Issues Involved:1. Vested Right of Appeal2. Application of Article 133 of the Constitution3. Application of Article 135 of the Constitution4. Interpretation of Statutes and Constitutional ProvisionsDetailed Analysis:1. Vested Right of Appeal:The petitioner argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which should be preserved under the Constitution. This claim was based on the principle established in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving [1905] A.C. 369, which held that a right of appeal is a substantive right that vests when the action is commenced. The Court examined various precedents, including Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421, and concluded that the right of appeal vested at the date of the institution of the suit and is governed by the law prevailing at that time.2. Application of Article 133 of the Constitution:Article 133(1) of the Constitution provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court if the value of the subject matter is not less than Rs. 20,000 or if the case is certified as fit for appeal. The majority held that Art. 133 should not be construed to retrospectively affect vested rights. The Court emphasized that the vested right of appeal, which existed before the Constitution, could not be taken away by Art. 133 unless it expressly or by necessary intendment provided for such a retrospective effect.3. Application of Article 135 of the Constitution:Article 135 provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over matters to which Articles 133 and 134 do not apply, if the jurisdiction was exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution. The majority opinion held that Art. 135 preserved the vested right of appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the judgment, decree, or final order was passed after the Constitution but the suit was instituted before it. The Court found that the vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which existed before the Constitution, was preserved under Art. 135.4. Interpretation of Statutes and Constitutional Provisions:The Court reiterated the principle that statutes should not be construed to have retrospective operation unless explicitly stated. The Court also emphasized the importance of interpreting constitutional provisions to avoid absurd results, such as depriving litigants of their vested rights without clear legislative intent. The Court referred to Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin [1929] I.L.R. 56 Cal. 512 and Vasudeva Samiar In re [1928] I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361, which supported the principle that the right of appeal is preserved throughout the career of the suit unless expressly taken away.Conclusion:The majority of the Court concluded that the petitioner had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court (now the Supreme Court) under the law prevailing at the time of the institution of the suit. This right was preserved under Art. 135 of the Constitution, and the High Court erred in refusing leave to appeal. Special leave to appeal was granted to the petitioner.Separate Judgment:Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissented, arguing that Art. 133 applies to all judgments passed after the Constitution, irrespective of when the suit was instituted. He contended that the vested right of appeal to the Federal Court ceased with its abolition and that Art. 135 did not apply to judgments passed after the Constitution. He emphasized that the language of Art. 133 is clear and should not be restricted by reading in additional words.