Retrospective court fee liability for counter claims rejected; fee on Debt Recovery Tribunal counter claims arose only after the express rule amendment.

A counter claim before the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not liable to court fee unless the governing rule expressly imposed such liability. The amendment to Rule 7, which brought counter claims within the fee provision with effect from 21.1.2003, operated prospectively only and contained no express or implied retrospectivity. As the counter claims in question were filed before that date, and court fee legislation must be strictly construed, no fee could be demanded on those counter claims. The directions requiring payment of court fee were therefore unsustainable and were set aside.

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Issues: Whether court fee was payable on a counter claim raised in a written statement before the Debt Recovery Tribunal before the amendment of Rule 7, and whether the later amendment could operate retrospectively to fasten such liability.

Analysis: Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 originally dealt with applications by banks and financial institutions and the fee prescribed for such applications. The amendment introducing counter claims enabled a defendant to set up a counter claim and treated it as a cross-suit only for the limited purpose of enabling the Tribunal to pass a final order on the original claim and the counter claim. The provision did not, by itself, extend the fee liability applicable to the bank's application to a counter claim. Rule 7 was amended only later, with effect from 21.1.2003, to expressly include counter claims within the fee provision. The amendment was prospective and there was no express or implied retrospectivity. Since the counter claims in the cases were filed before that date, and court fee legislation must be strictly construed, no fee could be demanded in the absence of a clear charging provision.

Conclusion: No court fee was payable on the counter claims filed before 21.1.2003, and the Tribunal's orders directing payment of court fee were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the impugned directions requiring payment of court fee on the counter claims were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A counter claim before the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not subject to court fee until the rule expressly provided for such fee, and the later amendment could not be applied retrospectively.

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