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Issues: (i) whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 falls within the expression "tribunal" in Article 136 of the Constitution of India and whether its award is open to special leave to appeal; (ii) whether the award was liable to be interfered with for want of evidence, denial of proper hearing, and non-compliance with the statutory requirement as to the constitution and signing of the award.
Issue (i): whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 falls within the expression "tribunal" in Article 136 of the Constitution of India and whether its award is open to special leave to appeal
Analysis: The Constitution confers a very wide special leave jurisdiction under Article 136, extending to judgments, decrees, determinations, sentences, or orders of any court or tribunal. The Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act was held to possess the trappings of a court and to discharge adjudicatory functions in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner. Its proceedings involved presentation of rival cases, reception of evidence, cross-examination, and decision of industrial disputes affecting valuable rights. The fact that the award required declaration by Government to become binding did not, in the majority view, destroy the character of the Tribunal's determination as a determination capable of scrutiny under Article 136.
Conclusion: The Tribunal's award was held to be within the scope of Article 136 and special leave was competent.
Issue (ii): whether the award was liable to be interfered with for want of evidence, denial of proper hearing, and non-compliance with the statutory requirement as to the constitution and signing of the award
Analysis: The majority found that the Tribunal had acted in a manner inconsistent with the statutory scheme and with principles of natural justice. The award was treated as unsustainable where the material on which victimization was found was not established by proper evidence and where the procedure adopted did not provide the kind of hearing and proof contemplated by the Act and the rules. The majority also treated compliance with the statutory requirement that the award be signed by all members of the Tribunal as mandatory, and held that an award signed only by two members, after the dispute had been heard by all three, was defective. On these grounds, the majority considered the award vulnerable to interference.
Conclusion: The award was held liable to be quashed for procedural and statutory non-compliance.
Final Conclusion: The majority treated the appeal as maintainable under Article 136 but upheld interference on the merits only to the extent indicated by the majority reasoning, with the overall result that the challenge to the award did not succeed before the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory body constituted by statute, which hears rival claims and determines industrial disputes affecting legal rights, may fall within Article 136 if it performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions with the trappings of a court; an award reached without proper evidentiary basis or in violation of mandatory statutory procedure is liable to be set aside.