Double jeopardy under Article 20(2) requires prior judicial prosecution; administrative customs confiscation and jail discipline do not always bar later action.

Article 20(2) double jeopardy applies only when the earlier proceeding was a prosecution and punishment for the same offence before a court or judicial tribunal acting judicially. Customs confiscation by Sea Customs Authorities was treated as administrative adjudication, not a judicial prosecution, so it did not bar later criminal proceedings. Disciplinary punishment imposed by the Jail Superintendent for a hunger-strike jail offence was likewise administrative; after that summary punishment, a further prosecution for the same jail offence was unauthorised, though separate Indian Penal Code offences remained prosecutable.

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Issues: (i) whether confiscation of gold by the Sea Customs Authorities amounted to a prosecution and punishment by a court or judicial tribunal so as to attract the bar under Article 20(2) of the Constitution; (ii) whether disciplinary action taken by the Jail Superintendent under the Preventive Detention Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules amounted to prosecution and punishment so as to bar subsequent proceedings, and whether the prosecution for certain jail offences could validly proceed.

Issue (i): Whether confiscation of gold by the Sea Customs Authorities amounted to a prosecution and punishment by a court or judicial tribunal so as to attract the bar under Article 20(2) of the Constitution.

Analysis: The protection against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) applies only where there has been a prosecution and punishment for the same offence before a court of law or a judicial tribunal acting judicially on legal evidence. The Sea Customs Authorities were constituted for administrative adjudication in aid of customs administration, with powers to confiscate goods, levy penalty, and provide for recovery, but without the attributes of a court or judicial tribunal. Their proceedings were not conducted as judicial trials, were not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence, and their confiscation order was in substance an administrative measure directed against the goods.

Conclusion: The customs confiscation did not amount to a prosecution and punishment within Article 20(2), and the subsequent criminal prosecution was not barred.

Issue (ii): Whether disciplinary action taken by the Jail Superintendent under the Preventive Detention Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules amounted to prosecution and punishment so as to bar subsequent proceedings, and whether the prosecution for certain jail offences could validly proceed.

Analysis: The Jail Superintendent under the detention rules was an administrative authority empowered to maintain discipline and impose summary punishments after such enquiry as he thought fit, not a judicial tribunal required to proceed on evidence on oath. Punishment imposed for the hunger strike by stopping letters, interviews, books, and newspapers was a disciplinary sanction within the rules. Once that punishment had been imposed, a further reference to the Magistrate for the same jail offence was unauthorised. However, the separate prosecution for offences under the Indian Penal Code, which were not covered as jail offences within the disciplinary scheme and were triable by the Magistrate, was not barred.

Conclusion: The prosecution for the hunger-strike jail offence was not maintainable after summary punishment, but the prosecution for the Indian Penal Code offences could proceed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal challenging the customs prosecution failed, while the connected petitions succeeded to the extent that prohibition issued against the unauthorised prosecution for the jail offence of hunger strike, with the remaining criminal prosecutions left unaffected where they related to separate offences triable by the Magistrate.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 20(2) is attracted only by a prior prosecution and punishment for the same offence before a court or judicial tribunal acting judicially, and administrative or disciplinary confiscation or punishment by an executive authority does not amount to such prosecution and punishment.

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