Article 226 permits consequential relief where statutory conditions are already satisfied and no further discretion remains.

Article 226 is wide enough to support consequential relief after quashing an unlawful order where the legal conditions are already found to exist and nothing further remains for the statutory authority to decide; the Court need not confine itself to setting aside the order and may direct the relief that follows as a legal consequence. Under the Rent Control Order, once the prescribed conditions for permission to terminate tenancy were satisfied on the facts found, the Rent Controller had no residual discretion to refuse permission on grounds outside the scheme. The refusal and appellate affirmation were therefore unsustainable, though one view held the Court should only quash and remit for fresh consideration.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court's power under Article 226 extends beyond quashing an order and permits consequential relief by directing the statutory authority to grant the permission sought. (ii) Whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority acted within the limits of the Rent Control Order in refusing permission to terminate the tenancy.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court's power under Article 226 extends beyond quashing an order and permits consequential relief by directing the statutory authority to grant the permission sought.

Analysis: The majority held that Article 226 is couched in wide terms and is not confined to the narrow English limits of certiorari and mandamus. After quashing an order passed by a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, the Court may grant appropriate consequential relief where nothing further remains to be decided and the relief is merely the legal consequence of the finding already recorded. The power is not an appellate power in the strict sense, but it is sufficiently wide to effectuate the Court's decision and prevent further injustice.

Conclusion: The High Court can, in an appropriate case, grant consequential relief and is not confined to merely quashing the impugned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the Rent Controller and the appellate authority acted within the limits of the Rent Control Order in refusing permission to terminate the tenancy.

Analysis: The majority found that the relevant conditions under the Rent Control Order were satisfied on the facts already found by the authorities. Once those conditions were met, the Rent Controller had no discretion to refuse permission on grounds outside the scheme of the Order. The refusal was therefore beyond the permissible scope of the statutory power and the appellate affirmation could not stand.

Conclusion: The refusal of permission was unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed and the petitioner was held entitled to the permission sought, with consequential relief granted to make the decision effective.

Concurring Opinion: Hemeon and Mudholkar JJ. held that Article 226 authorises the Court, after quashing an unlawful order, to issue the consequential direction or itself grant the relief where the legal conditions are already found to exist. Deo J. agreed with this approach and with the granting of consequential relief. Dissenting Opinion: Sinha C.J. held that the Court's power under Article 226 is confined to quashing the impugned order and returning the matter to the statutory authority for fresh determination according to law, without substituting its own decision.

Ratio Decidendi: The power under Article 226 is wide enough to include consequential relief necessary to effectuate the Court's decision where the statutory authority has no remaining discretion after the relevant legal conditions are found satisfied.

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