Writ jurisdiction cannot replace transport authority discretion; ownership is not a prerequisite for stage carriage permits.

Article 226 does not allow a High Court to act as an appellate body over statutory transport authorities or to substitute its own view for the exercise of discretion under a complete permit scheme. Writ interference is confined to jurisdictional error, illegality, breach of natural justice, or manifest injustice, and the ordinary statutory remedies for permit grant, refusal, appeal, and revision should be pursued within the Motor Vehicles Act framework. Ownership of buses is not a condition precedent to a stage carriage permit; possession of a vehicle meeting the statutory and rule-based requirements is the material consideration, with ownership being only a relevant factor in the authority's discretion.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, could interfere with the transport authorities' exercise of discretion in granting or cancelling motor vehicle permits and direct that permits be issued to a particular party. (ii) Whether ownership of the buses was a condition precedent to the grant of stage carriage permits under the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, could interfere with the transport authorities' exercise of discretion in granting or cancelling motor vehicle permits and direct that permits be issued to a particular party.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under Article 226 is intended to reach cases where subordinate tribunals or authorities act without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or in a manner causing manifest injustice. It does not authorise the High Court to sit as a court of appeal over administrative or quasi-judicial decisions and substitute its own view of the proper order to be made. The Motor Vehicles Act provides a complete scheme for grant, refusal, appeal and revision of permits, and the available remedies must ordinarily be pursued within that statutory framework.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the transport authorities, and it had no power to issue a positive direction to grant the permits.

Issue (ii): Whether ownership of the buses was a condition precedent to the grant of stage carriage permits under the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules.

Analysis: The relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act do not make ownership a necessary condition for obtaining a permit. Possession of a vehicle satisfying the statutory and rule-based requirements is the material consideration, while ownership may at best be one factor among others relevant to the authorities' discretion. The authorities therefore proceeded under a misconception if they treated title as decisive, but that misconception did not convert the High Court into an appellate authority entitled to re-determine the matter and grant relief itself.

Conclusion: Ownership of the buses was not a condition precedent to the grant of permits.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme vested discretion in the transport authorities, and the High Court exceeded the limits of its writ jurisdiction by directing the issue of permits; the appeal succeeded and the High Court's order was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 226, the High Court may correct jurisdictional error, illegality, or breach of natural justice, but it cannot act as an appellate body to substitute its own decision for that of a statutory authority exercising discretion under a complete regulatory code.

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