Judicial removal inquiry: no pre-submission report copy, no tribunal status, and review only after removal order.

Under the constitutional removal process for judges, the Inquiry Committee's report need not be supplied to the judge before it is forwarded to the Speaker, because the Act contemplates a statutory inquiry followed by the parliamentary stage only if guilt is found. The Committee is not a tribunal for Article 136 because its finding of guilt is not final or self-executing, but only initiates the next constitutional step. Judicial review of an adverse finding is available only after the process culminates in an order of removal, not at the pre-parliamentary stage. A dissent would have preferred prior disclosure and an opportunity for immediate review.

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Issues: (i) whether the concerned Judge was entitled to receive a copy of the Inquiry Committee's report before it was submitted to the Speaker so as to challenge adverse findings at that stage; (ii) whether the Inquiry Committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution; (iii) whether judicial review of the Committee's finding of guilt was available before commencement of the parliamentary stage or only after an order of removal was made.

Issue (i): whether the concerned Judge was entitled to receive a copy of the Inquiry Committee's report before it was submitted to the Speaker so as to challenge adverse findings at that stage.

Analysis: The constitutional and statutory scheme under Article 124(4) and (5) of the Constitution, Section 4 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and Rule 9 of the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 provides for an inquiry by a statutory committee and then, only if a finding of guilt is recorded, for the report to be laid before Parliament. The majority held that where the Committee records a finding of not guilty, the matter ends and no disclosure to Parliament is required of the dissenting view; where the finding is guilty, the parliamentary stage follows and the concerned Judge is to be given an opportunity to place his point of view before Parliament. On that construction, the Act does not require the Committee itself to supply the report to the Judge before submission to the Speaker, and there is no basis to interdict the statutory duty to forward the report promptly.

Conclusion: The concerned Judge was not entitled to a copy of the report from the Committee before its submission to the Speaker.

Issue (ii): whether the Inquiry Committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution.

Analysis: The Committee's finding of not guilty is final only in the sense that it terminates the proceeding, but a finding of guilty is not self-executing and merely enables the parliamentary stage to commence. Because the Committee's conclusion of guilt is not conclusive or determinative by itself, and because the process lacks the essential finality characteristic of a tribunal, the Committee does not answer the constitutional test of a tribunal under Article 136.

Conclusion: The Inquiry Committee is not a tribunal under Article 136.

Issue (iii): whether judicial review of the Committee's finding of guilt was available before commencement of the parliamentary stage or only after an order of removal was made.

Analysis: The majority read the constitutional scheme as a blended statutory and parliamentary process in which the statutory inquiry culminates in a tentative finding of guilt that may or may not be accepted by Parliament. Since the motion can fail even after a finding of guilt, judicial review at that intermediate stage would be premature. The proper occasion for judicial review arises only if the motion is adopted and an order of removal is made by the President, when the Judge may challenge the legality of the underlying finding on permissible grounds.

Conclusion: Judicial review was available only after an order of removal was made, not before the parliamentary process commenced.

Final Conclusion: The petition was not accepted on the claimed basis of pre-submission disclosure or immediate judicial review, and the Court declared the governing law accordingly while holding that any challenge to an adverse finding lies, if at all, only after the constitutional process culminates in removal.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge, the inquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is a statutory precursor to a parliamentary process, and an adverse finding of guilt by the Inquiry Committee is not final or tribunal-like so as to require prior disclosure to the Judge or immediate judicial review; any permissible challenge arises only after the process culminates in an order of removal.

Dissenting Opinion: K. Ramaswamy, J. would have held that the Judge was entitled to a copy of the report before submission to the Speaker and to a short withholding period to enable judicial review, treating the Committee as a high statutory tribunal and relying on natural justice.

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