Mandatory joinder in election petitions: a withdrawn candidate alleged of corrupt practice remained a necessary respondent.

A duly nominated person remained a "candidate" for purposes of Section 82(b) even after withdrawing candidature, and later acting as an election agent did not remove the mandatory requirement of impleadment when corrupt practice was alleged against him. Section 82 governs joinder in the election petition itself, while Section 99 applies only at the stage of final orders after trial, so reliance on Section 99 could not cure non-joinder. Because the omitted person was a necessary party, the election petition attracted dismissal under Section 86(1), and amendment under the Civil Procedure Code could not override the special statutory consequence.

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Issues: (i) Whether a person who was duly nominated as a candidate, but later withdrew his candidature and thereafter became an election agent, continued to remain a "candidate" so as to require joinder as a respondent under Section 82(b) when corrupt practice was alleged against him. (ii) Whether the election petition was liable to dismissal for non-joinder of such person and whether amendment or reliance on Section 99 could cure the defect.

Issue (i): Whether a person who was duly nominated as a candidate, but later withdrew his candidature and thereafter became an election agent, continued to remain a "candidate" so as to require joinder as a respondent under Section 82(b) when corrupt practice was alleged against him.

Analysis: Section 79(b) defines "candidate" as a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated. The definition was treated as broad enough to cover a duly nominated person even after withdrawal. Section 82(b) requires joinder of any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made, and the presence of an additional prayer for declaration that the petitioner be elected attracted Section 82(b) as well. The Court held that Section 82 and Section 99 operate in different fields: Section 82 governs who must be joined in the election petition itself, while Section 99 concerns naming persons found guilty after trial. A later role as election agent did not erase the person's status as a candidate, and the alleged agency relationship could not displace the mandatory requirement of impleadment.

Conclusion: Yes. A duly nominated person remained a candidate for the purpose of Section 82(b) despite withdrawal, and had to be impleaded as a respondent when corrupt practice was alleged against him.

Issue (ii): Whether the election petition was liable to dismissal for non-joinder of such person and whether amendment or reliance on Section 99 could cure the defect.

Analysis: Section 86(1) mandates dismissal of an election petition that does not comply with Sections 81, 82 or 117. Since the omitted person was a necessary party, non-joinder was fatal. The Court held that the Civil Procedure Code could not be used through amendment or striking out of parties to avoid the special consequence expressly provided by the election law. Reliance on Section 99 was rejected because that provision applies only at the stage of final orders after trial and cannot substitute for mandatory joinder at the threshold.

Conclusion: The election petition was rightly dismissed for non-compliance with Section 82(b), and the prayer for amendment was correctly rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed, and the impugned dismissal of the election petition was sustained on the ground of mandatory non-joinder of a necessary party alleged to have committed corrupt practice.

Ratio Decidendi: A duly nominated candidate continues to remain a "candidate" for purposes of Section 82(b) notwithstanding withdrawal of candidature, and if corrupt practice is alleged against him, his joinder as a respondent is mandatory; failure to do so renders the election petition liable to dismissal under Section 86(1).

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