Special statute summons power prevails over CrPC protection, and bias allegations need concrete material to succeed.

Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act was treated as an independent summons power, and the general protection in the proviso to Section 160 CrPC was held inapplicable because the special statute's scheme, reinforced by Sections 65 and 71, prevails unless there is silence or inconsistency. On that basis, personal appearance could be required despite the appellant's status as a woman and earlier permission to attend through an authorised representative. Allegations of bias or legal malice also failed because the record showed no material of real likelihood of bias or an unauthorised purpose; the summons were therefore upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether the proviso to Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 protected the appellant from appearing in person in proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were vitiated by bias or malice.

Issue (i): Whether the proviso to Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 protected the appellant from appearing in person in proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The provisions of Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 confer an independent power on the authority to summon any person, require attendance in person or through an authorised agent, and compel truthfully stated information in the course of investigation. Section 65 applies the Code of Criminal Procedure only where there is no inconsistency, while Section 71 gives overriding effect to the special enactment. The object and structure of the special enactment therefore do not permit reading the proviso to Section 160 of the Code into Section 50 of the special law. The authority was entitled, on relevant material, to require the appellant to appear personally notwithstanding her status as a woman and notwithstanding the earlier permission to appear through an authorised representative.

Conclusion: The protection under the proviso to Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was held inapplicable, and the summons requiring personal appearance were upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the summons issued under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were vitiated by bias or malice.

Analysis: Allegations of bias and legal malice require material showing a real likelihood of bias or a deliberate exercise of power for an unauthorised purpose. The record showed that the appellant was first allowed to attend through an authorised representative, and personal attendance was later sought because of contradictions and discrepancies that emerged during investigation. Mere non-denial of allegations did not establish malice, and the circumstances did not disclose any personal, pecuniary, or official bias. The challenge based on the earlier CBI proceedings and the professional privilege under the Evidence Act did not alter the statutory power conferred by the special enactment.

Conclusion: The allegations of bias and malice were rejected, and the summons were not held to be vitiated.

Final Conclusion: The special statute was construed as a self-contained code for summons and investigation, and its express procedural scheme was held to prevail over the general rule invoked from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute expressly confers power to summon persons during investigation and provides its own procedural framework, the general procedural protection under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be imported unless the special statute is silent or inconsistent, and allegations of bias or malice must be supported by material showing a real likelihood of bias or an unauthorised purpose.

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