Statutory review limits and withdrawal of writ protection: invalid recall directions and unreasoned cancellation orders cannot stand.

Review is a creature of statute and cannot be conferred by judicial direction; a recall or fresh reconsideration order passed without statutory authority is without jurisdiction and unsustainable. Withdrawal of a writ petition also causes interim protection and consequential orders passed during its pendency to fall away, since they cannot survive the disappearance of the main proceeding. A fresh administrative order cancelling hoarding approval, passed pursuant to an invalid direction, without hearing the affected parties and without reasons for reversing the earlier approval, was held vitiated for breach of natural justice and arbitrariness. The original contractual arrangement therefore remained operative.

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Issues: Whether the High Court could permit the Corporation to recall its earlier approval and pass a fresh order in the absence of any statutory power of review; whether the withdrawal of the writ petition neutralised the interim and consequential orders passed during its pendency; and whether the fresh order cancelling the hoarding approval was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could permit the Corporation to recall its earlier approval and pass a fresh order in the absence of any statutory power of review.

Analysis: Review is a creature of statute and cannot be exercised unless the governing enactment or rules expressly or by necessary implication confer that power. A court cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of a statutory authority by permitting it to do what the statute does not authorise. A recall or review order passed without such source of power is without jurisdiction, and any consequential action taken on that basis is equally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The direction permitting recall and fresh consideration was without jurisdiction and could not stand.

Issue (ii): Whether the withdrawal of the writ petition neutralised the interim and consequential orders passed during its pendency.

Analysis: Interim relief is only ancillary to the main relief and cannot survive once the proceeding itself is withdrawn or finally fails. A litigant cannot retain the benefit of an interim arrangement after voluntarily abandoning the challenge, because the foundation of the interim protection disappears and restitution follows. The consequence of withdrawal is that orders passed merely in aid of the withdrawn proceeding cannot continue to operate to the prejudice of the other side.

Conclusion: The withdrawal of the writ petition washed away the interim and consequential orders passed in those proceedings.

Issue (iii): Whether the fresh order cancelling the hoarding approval was sustainable.

Analysis: The fresh order was passed pursuant to an invalid judicial direction, without giving hearing to the affected parties and without recording reasons for departing from the earlier approval. An administrative order affecting civil rights must conform to the principles of natural justice and must disclose the basis for the change in stance. An unexplained reversal in such circumstances amounts to arbitrary action and legal malice in law.

Conclusion: The fresh order was vitiated and could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to proceed on the basis of the original contractual arrangement, unaffected by the impugned orders passed in the withdrawn writ proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of statutory power, review or recall cannot be conferred by judicial direction; and once the proceeding giving rise to interim protection is withdrawn or fails, the interim and consequential benefits do not survive.

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