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Issues: Whether the definition of "child" in Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 can be expanded to include the mental age of an adult who has crossed the age of eighteen years.
Analysis: The statutory definition of "child" is framed in clear and exhaustive terms as any person below the age of eighteen years. The scheme of the Act, including provisions on aggravated penetrative sexual assault, medical examination, child-friendly procedure, and Special Courts, repeatedly uses the term "child" in its ordinary chronological sense and separately refers to mental disability where the legislature intended to do so. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble reinforce the protective object of the Act, but they do not justify rewriting the definition. While purposive interpretation may be used to advance legislative intent, it cannot be used to supply words that the legislature deliberately omitted, especially where the text is plain and the distinction between children and adults is maintained across allied enactments.
Conclusion: The definition of "child" in Section 2(d) cannot be read to include mental age, and the statutory expression is confined to biological age below eighteen years.