Purposive interpretation of Industrial Court presidency provisions upheld nomination of a qualified judicial officer and rejected constitutional challenge.

Section 10(2) read with Section 10(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was construed purposively to mean that the President of the Industrial Court need not first be appointed from among existing Members. The Court held that the provision fixes the Court's composition and eligibility for membership, but does not restrict the mode of filling the presidential office, so direct nomination of a duly qualified person was not excluded. It also held that the appointment of a judicial officer by nomination was not arbitrary or discriminatory, because the process involved High Court consideration, eligibility assessment, and consultation, and therefore did not violate Articles 14 or 16.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 10(2) read with Section 10(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 requires that the President of the Industrial Court must first be appointed as an existing Member of the Industrial Court. (ii) Whether appointment of a judicial officer by nomination to the post of President of the Industrial Court was invalid or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether Section 10(2) read with Section 10(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 requires that the President of the Industrial Court must first be appointed as an existing Member of the Industrial Court.

Analysis: Section 10(2) governs the composition of the Industrial Court and states that it shall consist of three or more members, one of whom shall be its President. It does not prescribe the mode of appointment or say that the President must be chosen only from among existing members. Section 10(4) prescribes the eligibility for membership, and the scheme of the provision does not create a separate eligibility code for the office of President. A purposive reading was preferred over a narrow literal construction that would make the office impossible to fill at the initial constitution of the Court and would lead to absurdity.

Conclusion: Section 10(2) does not require that the President must first be an existing Member of the Industrial Court, and a direct appointment by nomination is not excluded.

Issue (ii): Whether appointment of a judicial officer by nomination to the post of President of the Industrial Court was invalid or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The record showed that the High Court's administrative side considered the vacancy repeatedly, examined eligible officers, and recommended the appointee after applying the draft recruitment criteria. The appointee satisfied the qualifying requirements, and the process did not disclose arbitrariness or discrimination. Since there was no statutory bar to nomination and consultation with the High Court was part of the process, the appointment could not be struck down as unfair or unconstitutional.

Conclusion: The appointment by nomination was valid and was not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appointment was upheld, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the challenge to the notification failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute prescribes the composition and eligibility for a judicial tribunal but does not expressly restrict the mode of filling its presidency, the provision must be construed purposively to permit appointment by nomination of a duly qualified person, provided the process is non-arbitrary and constitutionally compliant.

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