2004 (12) TMI 668 - SC - Indian Laws

Section 14D cannot be invoked by a widow who acquires an already tenanted property to evict preexisting tenant

Nathi Devi Versus Radha Devi Gupta

The SC held that Section 14D applies only where the premises were let out by the widow or by her husband; a widow who acquires an already tenanted ... Application for the eviction - required the premises for bona fide personal need - invoking the provisions of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('Act') - Relationship between landlord and tenant - HELD THAT:- Section 14D uses the expression, 'premises let out by her, or by her husband' which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of 'such premises'. 'Such premises' obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, 'let out by her or by her husband' and 'such premises' in Section 14D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting tenant. We, therefore, prefer the reasoning in Surjit Singh Kalra [1991 (2) TMI 405 - SUPREME COURT] which took the same view. Since we have held that the respondent was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 14D of the Act, it would be futile to remit the matter to the Court of Additional Rent Controller for granting leave to defend. We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as well as that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi and dismiss the application filed by the respondent under Section 14D of the Act. Issues Involved:1. Applicability of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.2. Interpretation of the term 'let out' in Section 14D.3. Relationship between landlord and tenant.4. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Applicability of Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:The respondent, a widow, filed an eviction petition under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming bona fide need for the premises for her own residence. The Additional Rent Controller and the High Court both upheld her claim, stating that the conditions for Section 14D were met since she was a widow requiring the premises for her own residence. However, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the respondent, who acquired the premises by purchase, could invoke Section 14D.2. Interpretation of the term 'let out' in Section 14D:The appellant contended that Section 14D only applies if the premises were let out by the widow or her husband. The Supreme Court noted a conflict between two previous judgments: Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India, which supported the appellant's view, and Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak, which suggested a broader interpretation. The Court concluded that the term 'let out by her, or by her husband' in Section 14D must be strictly interpreted to mean that the premises must have been let out by the widow or her deceased husband, not by any other person.3. Relationship between landlord and tenant:The appellant argued that there was no landlord-tenant relationship with the respondent since the premises were not let out by her or her husband. The Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing that Section 14D specifically requires the premises to have been let out by the widow or her husband. Therefore, the respondent, who purchased the premises, could not establish the requisite landlord-tenant relationship under Section 14D.4. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation:The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the literal interpretation of statutes unless it leads to absurdity. It stated that every word in a statute is presumed to have a purpose, and the expression 'let out by her, or by her husband' in Section 14D was intentional and specific. The Court rejected the broader interpretation that would render these words redundant. It also noted that Sections 14B to 14D were exceptions to the general rule under Section 14(1)(e) and must be construed strictly.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent could not invoke Section 14D as the premises were not let out by her or her husband. The Court preferred the reasoning in Surjit Singh Kalra and found that the High Court erred in its interpretation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the eviction order under Section 14D was set aside. The application filed by the respondent under Section 14D was dismissed.