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Issues: (i) whether the High Court could direct the Census authorities to conduct a caste-wise census in a particular manner by issuing a mandamus that effectively reshaped a governmental policy under the Census Act, 1940; (ii) whether the earlier order relied upon by the High Court could bind the Census Commissioner when he had not been impleaded as a party in the earlier proceedings.
Issue (i): whether the High Court could direct the Census authorities to conduct a caste-wise census in a particular manner by issuing a mandamus that effectively reshaped a governmental policy under the Census Act, 1940.
Analysis: The power to determine the manner in which census information is to be collected rested with the Central Government under Section 8 of the Census Act, 1940, and the Government had issued notifications prescribing the information to be gathered. The Court held that judicial review does not extend to framing policy in a particular manner or to substituting a court-directed policy for an executive decision, unless the policy is arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions. The High Court's direction to undertake caste-wise census was, therefore, an impermissible intrusion into policy-making.
Conclusion: The direction for caste-wise census was unauthorized and unsustainable, and the appeal succeeded on this issue.
Issue (ii): whether the earlier order relied upon by the High Court could bind the Census Commissioner when he had not been impleaded as a party in the earlier proceedings.
Analysis: An order passed behind the back of a person likely to be affected, without impleading that person as a party, is not binding upon that person and may be ignored for want of compliance with the principles of natural justice. The Census Commissioner, being the real aggrieved party, had not been a party to the earlier writ proceeding, and the prior direction could not, therefore, operate against him as a binding adjudication.
Conclusion: The earlier order did not bind the Census Commissioner and could not justify repetition of the same direction.
Final Conclusion: The impugned directions were set aside because the High Court had transgressed the limits of judicial review by mandating a policy choice reserved to the executive and by relying on an earlier order that was not binding on the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi: Courts cannot compel the executive to adopt a particular policy formulation through mandamus, and an order passed without impleading an affected party does not bind that party.