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Issues: (i) Whether the power under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 includes the power to modify, vary or enhance an arbitral award made under the National Highways Act, 1956. (ii) Whether the Court should interfere with the impugned awards and High Court orders on the facts of these cases.
Issue (i): Whether the power under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 includes the power to modify, vary or enhance an arbitral award made under the National Highways Act, 1956.
Analysis: Section 34 is confined to recourse against an award by way of an application for setting aside it on limited grounds. The scheme of the 1996 Act, which follows the UNCITRAL Model Law, does not contain the wider powers found in the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 34(4) permits only a limited remand to remove curable defects and does not authorise the Court to correct the merits of the award or substitute its own determination. Earlier decisions under the 1940 Act and orders traceable to Article 142 do not establish a general power under Section 34 to modify an award. The contrary view taken by the Madras High Court was held to be incorrect.
Conclusion: No. Section 34 does not confer power to modify, vary or enhance an arbitral award.
Issue (ii): Whether the Court should interfere with the impugned awards and High Court orders on the facts of these cases.
Analysis: Although the awards were found to be based on an unsound method of valuation and the Court disapproved of the reasoning adopted below, interference was declined in the peculiar facts. Similar landholders had already received higher compensation in connected matters, and remitting the disputes back after substantial delay would have been unfair and productive of further discrimination. The Court therefore exercised restraint in the appeals under Article 136.
Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere on facts.
Final Conclusion: The law was settled against judicial modification of arbitral awards under Section 34, but the appeals were left undisturbed in the result because the Court chose not to interfere with the compensation awards in these matters.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court may only set aside an arbitral award on the statutorily limited grounds and cannot modify, vary or enhance the award.