Condonation of delay in commercial arbitration appeals allowed only on strict sufficient cause; rigid 120-day bar rejected.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with the Commercial Courts Act, but only in a strict, exceptional manner consistent with the legislative policy of speedy disposal and finality. The phrase "sufficient cause" must be construed in that context, so long or unexplained delays are not to be routinely condoned. The earlier view that delay beyond 120 days could never be condoned in such appeals was rejected as too rigid and inconsistent with the commercial arbitration regime. The Court applied the revised standard to the individual appeals, allowing relief only where the explanation for delay was legally adequate and refusing condonation where the delay remained unexplained.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and whether delay beyond the prescribed appellate period can be condoned only in exceptional cases. (ii) Whether the earlier view that delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned in such appeals was correctly decided, and whether the delays in the appeals before the Court were sufficiently explained.

Issue (i): Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and whether delay beyond the prescribed appellate period can be condoned only in exceptional cases.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of arbitration, the Limitation Act, and the Commercial Courts Act shows a common legislative emphasis on speedy disposal and finality. Section 37 appeals are governed by the limitation framework supplied by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, and for most commercial arbitration appeals by Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act. The Court held that Section 5 is not excluded altogether, but the expression "sufficient cause" must be understood in the context of the legislative object of expedition. Accordingly, condonation beyond the prescribed period is not a matter of course, and long delays cannot be routinely excused.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies, but only exceptionally and in a manner consistent with the mandate of speedy resolution; long and unexplained delays are not to be condoned as a rule.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier view that delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned in such appeals was correctly decided, and whether the delays in the appeals before the Court were sufficiently explained.

Analysis: The prior view excluding condonation beyond 120 days was held to be incorrect because it failed to account for the regime of the Commercial Courts Act and wrongly grafted the structure of Section 34(3) onto Section 37 appeals. That earlier view was overruled. On the facts of the individual appeals, one appeal involved an unexplained long delay and was dismissed, another lacked sufficient cause and the impugned order was set aside, and the third also involved a huge unexplained delay and was dismissed. The Court therefore applied the newly stated standard to the facts and granted relief only where the explanation was legally sufficient.

Conclusion: The earlier rigid rule was overruled, and the appeals were disposed of on the basis that only one appeal succeeded while the others failed for want of sufficient cause.

Final Conclusion: The governing principle is that delay in commercial arbitration appeals may be condoned only on a strict showing of sufficient cause consistent with the object of expedition; the rigid 120-day absolute bar was rejected, but unexplained long delays were not excused.

Ratio Decidendi: In appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, delay may be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only in a fit case, and the phrase "sufficient cause" must be construed in light of the statutory policy of speedy and final resolution of arbitration and commercial disputes.

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