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Issues: (i) Whether, for a suit against a carrier for non-delivery of goods, the period of limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act begins to run only on the carrier's final refusal to deliver or on the expiry of a reasonable time for carriage; (ii) whether the appellant should be permitted to rely on the Displaced Persons legislation on limitation and have the matter remanded for that limited inquiry.
Issue (i): Whether, for a suit against a carrier for non-delivery of goods, the period of limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act begins to run only on the carrier's final refusal to deliver or on the expiry of a reasonable time for carriage.
Analysis: The expression "when the goods ought to be delivered" was construed according to its plain grammatical meaning. The provision was held to apply both to non-delivery and delay in delivery, and in either case the starting point is the expiry of the reasonable time required for carriage from the place of despatch to the place of destination, unless a contract fixes the time of delivery. The Court rejected the view that limitation begins only upon final refusal by the carrier. Subsequent correspondence merely about tracing the goods does not ordinarily alter the starting point, though an acknowledgment of liability may give a fresh starting point. On the facts, the reasonable time had expired well before the suit was filed, and the suit was time-barred under Article 31.
Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellant should be permitted to rely on the Displaced Persons legislation on limitation and have the matter remanded for that limited inquiry.
Analysis: The appellant sought the benefit of the Displaced Persons legislation, which had not been specifically relied upon on the limitation issue in the pleadings. Considering the appellant's claim to be a displaced person and the surrounding circumstances, the Court found it appropriate in the interest of justice to give an opportunity to establish entitlement under that legislation. The remand was confined only to the question of limitation under the Displaced Persons enactments, with evidence to be led if necessary and costs secured against the appellant as directed.
Conclusion: The appellant was allowed to invoke the Displaced Persons legislation on limitation, and the matter was remanded for that limited determination.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the dismissal of the suit was set aside and the matter was sent back for a fresh decision on limitation under the Displaced Persons enactments alone.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 31 of the Limitation Act, time runs from the expiry of the reasonable time for carriage of goods, not from the carrier's final refusal, and a later remand may be ordered where a statutory limitation benefit under the Displaced Persons legislation requires fresh factual inquiry.
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