Delayed sickness reference not time-barred where the statute provides penalty but no express bar on consideration.

A delayed reference under section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 was held not to be incompetent merely because it was filed beyond sixty days from finalisation of duly audited accounts. The statutory scheme treated the sixty-day period as a promptness requirement for the board of directors, while section 33 supplied the penal consequence for non-compliance. Because the Act did not expressly direct rejection of a delayed reference as time-barred, the Board retained jurisdiction to consider the reference on merits and could not dismiss it solely for delay.

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Issues: Whether a reference made to the Board under section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 could be rejected as time-barred for having been filed beyond sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts, or whether the consequence of delay was confined to penal action under section 33 of the Act.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished between the time prescribed for making the reference by the board of directors and the consequences of non-compliance. Section 3(1)(da) defined the relevant date, section 15(1) fixed the sixty-day period for reference by the company, section 15(2) enabled other specified authorities to make a reference even beyond that period, and section 33 provided penal consequences for violation of the Act. On that construction, the time limit in section 15(1) was intended to ensure prompt action by the board of directors, but the Act did not provide that a delayed reference by the company must be rejected as time-barred. The delay could attract penal consequences, but it did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to consider the reference.

Conclusion: The reference could not be dismissed as time-barred; the Board was required to consider it on merits in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the writ petition succeeded, with a direction to the Board to deal with the reference according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes a time limit for a company to make a reference but does not expressly provide rejection of a delayed reference, the delay may entail penal consequences, yet the reference itself cannot be treated as incompetent or time-barred.

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