2025 (9) TMI 1721 - SC - Indian Laws

Section 5 Limitation Act: No Automatic Condonation for Inordinate Delay Based on Administrative Lapses or Case Merits

SC held that under Section 5 Limitation Act, 'sufficient cause' must cover the entire period from the commencement of limitation until filing, and that ... Interpretation of statute - meaning and import of the expression “within such period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act - exercise of discretion in condoning the delay by a lower court be interfered with by a court in appeal - correctness in condonation of delay - sufficient cause for delay or not. Meaning and Scope of the expression “Within Such Period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- The period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is demonstrated. Rather, the expression “may be admitted after the prescribed period” clearly indicates that it is only that period, which has been subsumed after the expiry of limitation, as a result of the “sufficient cause” persisting, which would be effectively getting extended by way of condonation. Thus, while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with the manner in which the court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period which the court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If the contention is accepted that “sufficient cause” has to be demonstrated only for that length of the period that is required to be extended, in order to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, then it would result in “extension” being conflated with “exclusion”. Although semantically both may appear to be one and the same, and even the end-result that would ensue if “extension” is read as “exclusion” would in substance be the same, as ultimately it would be that period after the expiry of limitation till the actual filing that would be extended or excluded to admit the appeal, yet there is very fine but discernible difference between the two, which if not appreciated, would completely warp the mechanism of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as envisaged by the legislature. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not say that, once “sufficient cause” is established and the court is also satisfied about the same, then the appeal or application, has to be mandatorily be admitted. On the contrary, the provision, by use of the word “may” lays emphasis that even after the court is satisfied about the existence of a “sufficient cause”, it has the discretion to decide, whether to admit the appeal or application, as the case may be, or not - thus, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days. What is to be understood by “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation? - HELD THAT:- The phrase “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an expression of elastic import, incapable of precise definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to empower courts to advance the cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on account of unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is equally clear that the phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to revive stale claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes - The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence. The expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control - The expression “sufficient cause” must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. Thus, in exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause”, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantive Justice - HELD THAT:- Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain - The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity. In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with? - HELD THAT:- The recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is not an inter-parte proceeding. Condonation of delay essentially is a question that the court has to decide on the basis of the material on records and the relevant law. The role of the parties is only confined to brining on record the relevant material to assist the court in exercising its discretion. Unlike adversarial proceedings in a lis where competing claims and counterclaims of parties are adjudicated, the adjudication under Section 5 is primarily inquisitorial in nature, with the court being called upon to assess, on an objective consideration of facts and circumstances, whether the explanation offered is sufficient and reasonable so as to warrant an extension of time, from the material it has relied upon for furnishing such explanation. The Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami Chettiar [1917 (11) TMI 3 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that an order of a court excusing the delay is not final or precluded from being questioned, and that it is always open to reconsideration at the instance of the party so affected by it. The appellate court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a finding based on its likes or dislikes. The true test is to see, if it had been up to the appellate court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were fulfilled or not. If the ingredients of the provision is found to not have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the order of the court below. No room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- For the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in cases where condonation of delay is sought by the State or any of its instrumentalities, there the courts should not apply the standard of strict scrutiny that is ordinarily applied to private parties. Instead, a pragmatic approach must be adopted that acknowledges the practical realities of governmental functioning and accords some latitude to the State, consistent with the maxim; ‘lex non cogit ad impossibilia’ i.e., the law does not compel the impossible. The courts ought to remain mindful of the proverbially slow pace at which governmental decisions often move, weighed down by procedural encumbrances and institutional delays. A certain degree of latitude, therefore, must be extended to the State and its instrumentalities in matters concerning the condonation of delay, lest the rigidity of limitation operate to the detriment of public interest - The ultimate test that was evolved whether substantial justice would suffer if condonation were denied. Thus, the balance was tilted in favour of condonation when the litigant was the State, as denial could prejudice public interest, frustrate legitimate claims, or impact the public exchequer. The jurisprudence therefore evolved to give primacy to public interest over procedural rigidity. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the decision of Postmaster General [2012 (4) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT] - HELD THAT:- As per the ratio of Postmaster General and a plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as “sufficient cause”. They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be accepted. Whether exercise of discretion in view of the earlier position of law may be interfered with? - HELD THAT:- The question, whether interference on ground of change in law during pendency of proceedings, would really turn upon the context and nature of the discretion exercised. Ordinarily, such an interference would not only be justified but also warranted. But when it comes to condonation of delay, the considerations are slightly different, inasmuch as the court is required to prioritize a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach over technicalities. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Thus, in such situations, the court may be refuse to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower court in condoning the delay, as long as view that was arrived at by the court below could have been taken by it, from the material on record, keeping in mind the position of law that prevailed then. However, this would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, and the attending circumstances, and what inevitably follows is that, there may be situations, where the appellate court may interfere, keeping in mind the changed position of law. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the State or any of its instrumentalities - HELD THAT:- An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the statute. Whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay? - HELD THAT:- The High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court. The impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside - The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority - Appeal allowed. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1.1 Section 5 - Scope of 'within such period' - Whether the expression 'within such period' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act refers only to the period after expiry of limitation or to the entire span from commencement of limitation till actual filing. 1.2 Section 5 - Content of 'sufficient cause' and limits of liberal approach - What is meant by 'sufficient cause' in Section 5; whether length of delay is material; and the balance between technical limitation and substantial justice. 1.3 Appellate interference with condonation orders - In what circumstances an appellate court may interfere with a lower court's discretionary order condoning delay under Section 5. 1.4 Condonation where the applicant is the State or its instrumentalities - Whether State entities are entitled to any special latitude under Section 5; impact of the later jurisprudence (including Postmaster General) on earlier 'lenient' views; and the role of 'public interest' in condonation of delay. 1.5 Justification for condonation on facts - Whether the High Court was justified in condoning a delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal by the respondent housing corporation. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Scope of 'within such period' in Section 5 Legal framework 2.1 Section 5 permits admission of an appeal/application 'after the prescribed period' if the applicant shows 'sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period'. Section 3 mandates dismissal of proceedings filed after the prescribed period, subject to Sections 4-24. Interpretation and reasoning 2.2 The Court traced two conflicting lines of precedent: one confining 'within such period' to the interval between the last day of limitation and actual filing (e.g. Rewa Coalfields, Chandra Mani); and another requiring explanation for the entire period of limitation itself (e.g. Ajit Singh Thakur, Ramkumar Choudhary). 2.3 On a textual reading, the phrase 'within such period' cannot be divorced from the associated expressions 'after the prescribed period' and 'for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period'. The word 'such' refers to the original statutory period of limitation, while 'after the prescribed period' refers to the period of delay post-expiry. 2.4 Reading the provision as a whole, 'within such period' necessarily encompasses both: (i) the entire prescribed period of limitation; and (ii) the period after expiry of limitation until the actual date of filing. 2.5 The Court held that Rewa Coalfields erred in (i) treating 'within such period' as referring only to the post-limitation interval; (ii) equating any requirement to explain conduct during limitation with interpreting the words as 'during such period'; and (iii) ignoring earlier binding authority (including Dinabandhu Sahu and Sitaram Ramcharan) which treated 'sufficient cause' as covering the whole span from start of limitation to filing. 2.6 The Court clarified that condonation under Section 5 extends, but does not 'exclude', the period consumed after expiry of limitation. 'Extension' cannot be conflated with 'exclusion'; otherwise 'sufficient cause' would be confined only to the quantum of post-limitation delay needed to push the filing back into the limitation period, contrary to the text and structure of Section 5. 2.7 The Court reaffirmed the principle that 'sufficient cause' must have its genesis within the limitation period; events after expiry may prolong delay but cannot substitute for absence of cause during limitation. It clarified that the sentence in Ramkumar Choudhary that events after the 91st day are 'of no consequence' must be read contextually to mean that, in the absence of any cause during limitation, post-limitation events are irrelevant. 2.8 In light of the canons of limitation (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) and the duty under Section 3, the Court rejected any interpretation of Section 5 that neutralises the requirement of vigilance during the limitation period or immunises inaction except on the last day. Conclusions 2.9 For purposes of Section 5, 'within such period' covers the entire continuum from the date when limitation begins to run up to the date of actual filing. The applicant must establish 'sufficient cause' for this entire duration, not merely for the interval after expiry of the prescribed period. Issue 2 - Meaning of 'sufficient cause' and limits of the liberal approach Legal framework 2.10 Section 5 does not define 'sufficient cause'; its content has been evolved judicially. Earlier decisions (including Krishna v. Chathappan, Dinabandhu Sahu, Shakuntala Devi Jain, Basawaraj, Esha Bhattacharjee, Pathapati Subba Reddy, Sheo Raj Singh) were analysed and synthesised. Interpretation and reasoning 2.11 'Sufficient cause' is an elastic expression, to be construed liberally to advance substantial justice, but not so liberally as to condone negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides or casual indifference. The burden lies on the applicant to show that failure to file in time was not attributable to its own fault. 2.12 The Court endorsed the settled principles that: (a) The applicant must not have acted negligently, remained inactive, or lacked bona fides; (b) Liberal or justice-oriented approach is permissible so long as negligence or want of good faith cannot be imputed; (c) Gross negligence and concocted or fanciful grounds must be refused; (d) The entire gamut of facts and conduct must be carefully scrutinised; and (e) State and public bodies may receive some latitude, but within the same legal framework. 2.13 The Court distinguished 'explanation' from 'excuse': an explanation gives a truthful account showing that the delay was beyond the party's reasonable control; an excuse is a defensive effort to avoid responsibility, often unsupported by bona fide material. Only the former can amount to 'sufficient cause'. 2.14 On length of delay, the Court held that quantum of delay is not determinative. Even short delay can be refused if no cause is shown; long delay can be condoned if supported by cogent explanation. Length of delay is, however, instructive, because greater delay demands more rigorous and convincing justification. 2.15 The Court reiterated that while rules of limitation are founded on public policy, they are not intended to destroy rights; yet they must be applied with full rigour when the statute so prescribes. A strong case on merits is irrelevant at the stage of condonation; merits cannot substitute for proof of 'sufficient cause'. Considering merits at this stage risks prejudicing substantive adjudication and undermines the uniform application of limitation law. Conclusions 2.16 'Sufficient cause' under Section 5 requires a bona fide, diligent, and coherent explanation covering the entire period from commencement of limitation to filing. Courts must: (i) adopt a liberal, justice-oriented approach where the explanation is bona fide and free from negligence; but (ii) decline condonation where there is gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of diligence or casualness, regardless of the perceived merits of the case. Issue 3 - When may appellate courts interfere with condonation of delay Legal framework 2.17 Section 5 uses the expression 'may be admitted', vesting a discretion in the court even after 'sufficient cause' is shown. Earlier authorities (including Krishnasami Panikondar, Dinabandhu Sahu, N. Balakrishnan, Shanti Prasad Gupta, Mithailal Dalsangar Singh, Manjunath Anandappa, Gujarat Steel Tubes, Sheo Raj Singh) were examined. Interpretation and reasoning 2.18 The Court distinguished two situations: (a) Where the court of first instance refuses to condone delay: appellate court may reconsider the explanation afresh and reach its own conclusion; and (b) Where the court below condones delay: appellate scrutiny is narrower and focuses on the propriety of the exercise of discretion. 2.19 In appeals against orders granting condonation, the appellate court must conduct a two-step inquiry: (i) Whether the material on record could reasonably support a finding of 'sufficient cause' for the entire relevant period (as correctly understood under Section 5); and (ii) Whether the discretion to condone was exercised judicially, and not arbitrarily, mechanically, capriciously, on extraneous considerations, or in disregard of settled law and relevant facts. 2.20 If the lower court's view on 'sufficient cause' is plausible, supported by material, and in conformity with law, the appellate court should not substitute its own opinion merely because an alternative view is possible. Interference is justified only where the order is clearly wrong - i.e., based on no evidence, material irregularity, misdirection in law, or perverse appreciation of facts. 2.21 The Court clarified that a subsequent change in law generally has retrospective operation. Thus, if the law on limitation / condonation shifts while an appeal against a condonation order is pending, the appellate court is bound to apply the law as it stands at the time of decision. However, whether interference should occur in every such case will depend on the facts and the nature of the change; no rigid rule can be laid down. Conclusions 2.22 An appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay when: (a) 'Sufficient cause' has not been made out in law for the entire period from commencement of limitation to filing; or (b) The discretion to condone delay has been exercised on wholly untenable grounds, arbitrarily, capriciously, mechanically, or in disregard of binding principles of limitation. 2.23 Where the view of the court below is legally untenable or contrary to the current settled position of law, interference is warranted, even though condonation was permissible under a looser earlier understanding. Issue 4 - Condonation where delay is by the State or its instrumentalities Legal framework 2.24 The Court surveyed the earlier jurisprudence (including K.V. Ayisumma, Chandra Mani, Lipok Ao, G. Ramegowda, Indian Oil Corporation) which had afforded some latitude to the State on account of 'impersonal machinery', 'red tape' and bureaucratic decision-making, as well as contrary decisions emphasising equality of treatment. It then examined the subsequent shift ushered in by Postmaster General and followed by later decisions (including Bherulal, University of Delhi, Sunanda Mahakuda, Sabha Narain, Tejpal, Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy). Interpretation and reasoning 2.25 Earlier decisions justified a more liberal approach towards State delay on grounds that: government decisions are institutional and slow; no single officer has a personal stake; and dismissal of government appeals may ultimately prejudice public interest and the public exchequer. Simultaneously, even those decisions stressed the need for legal cells, prompt action and officer accountability, and warned that such indulgence could not be permanent. 2.26 The Court held that this earlier line must now be read in light of the clear ratio of Postmaster General, as thereafter consistently followed and explained. The two core components of that ratio are: (i) No special or preferential treatment: The State and its instrumentalities stand on the same footing as private litigants for purposes of Section 5; a different yardstick cannot be applied merely because the applicant is a government entity; and (ii) Bureaucratic lethargy is not, by itself, 'sufficient cause': Explanations based solely on file-pushing, procedural red tape, internal approvals, or negligence of officers do not automatically qualify as sufficient cause. Government departments are under a 'special obligation' to act with diligence and cannot treat condonation as an anticipated benefit. 2.27 The Court clarified that Postmaster General does not absolutely bar condonation for State entities in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The dividing line is between: (a) cases where delay is the product of gross negligence, casual indifference, or systemic apathy; and (b) cases where, despite adherence to a diligent process and bona fide efforts, delay still occurs due to genuine systemic constraints or unavoidable circumstances. 2.28 In the former category, condonation must be refused; in the latter, it remains open to be granted on demonstration of bona fides and diligence. Courts must carefully distinguish between 'explanation' and 'excuse' in State cases; experience shows that pleas of 'bureaucratic delay' are usually mere excuses. 2.29 The Court further held that: (i) 'Public interest' cannot be treated as an automatic trump card to condone delay; true public interest lies in timely, efficient governance and finality of litigation, not in perpetually excusing State indolence; (ii) Treating State delay leniently on generic grounds of 'public interest' or 'government machinery' would violate equality before law, incentivise inefficiency, and erode accountability; and (iii) Acts or omissions of government officers cannot be treated as a blanket shield to immunise the State from limitation; at most, officers may be personally proceeded against. 2.30 The Court expressly held that the earlier 'lenient' view (treating impersonal and slow governmental processes as a general ground for condonation) 'no longer reflects the correct position of law'. Routine reliance on such reasons is impermissible in the current jurisprudence. Conclusions 2.31 Under the law as it now stands: (a) The State and its instrumentalities are to be treated on par with private litigants in the matter of limitation and condonation; (b) Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, even for government bodies; and (c) Explanations based on bureaucratic lethargy, red tape, 'file movement', or internal negligence will ordinarily not constitute 'sufficient cause' unless accompanied by a detailed, bona fide narrative demonstrating reasonable diligence throughout the limitation period and thereafter. Issue 5 - Whether the High Court was justified in condoning 3966 days' delay Application of principles to the facts 2.32 The delay in filing the second appeal was 3966 days (almost 11 years). The explanation of the respondent housing corporation was broadly that: (i) The legal department advised filing a second appeal in 2006, but the designated Executive Engineer/litigation officer failed to furnish necessary documents despite repeated letters; (ii) The decision to file was taken only in October 2006, already beyond limitation; (iii) Despite initiation of execution proceedings and notice in 2011, no effective steps were taken; (iv) The Commissioner only became fully aware in 2017 when an attachment order was passed, following which a new officer was appointed and the appeal filed; and (v) Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the delinquent officer shortly before moving for condonation. 2.33 The Court held that, even if this narrative is accepted at face value, it fails on the essential requirements of Section 5: (a) There was no explanation constituting 'sufficient cause' for the critical period from receipt of the First Appellate Court's judgment (April 2006) until expiry of limitation (around July 2006); the decision to appeal only crystallised in October 2006, already too late; (b) There was virtually no explanation showing diligence between 2006 and 2011; even after service of execution notice in 2011, the same negligent officer was continued in charge, and no effective steps were taken till 2017; and (c) Disciplinary action initiated in March 2017, after filing for condonation, appeared to be an attempt to demonstrate artificial 'bona fides' rather than evidence of sustained vigilance. 2.34 The Court rejected the contention that the mala fide or negligent acts of individual officers should not be attributed to the public body. Given the current law, the State cannot rely on internal fault-lines to escape the rigours of limitation. The respondent failed to show any system of timely oversight or corrective measures once negligence became evident. 2.35 The Court observed that condoning such an enormous delay on these facts would: (i) reward institutional lethargy and indifference; (ii) unfairly prejudice the decree-holder, who has been litigating since 1989 and has not reaped the fruits of the decree for over three decades; and (iii) effectively allow the State entity to fix its own limitation period, undermining the statutory scheme and the public policy behind limitation. 2.36 The Court further held that the High Court's approach was legally flawed because: (a) It treated alleged 'merits' in the proposed second appeal (including challenges to the moulding of relief and maintainability) as a ground to condone delay, contrary to the principle that merits are irrelevant at the condonation stage; (b) It performed 'merit-hunting' and treated a 'semblance of right' as part of 'sufficient cause', which is impermissible; and (c) It relied on precedents involving short delays, without appreciating the magnitude and unexplained nature of the present delay. 2.37 On the standard of appellate interference, the Court held that the High Court's order could not be sustained as a proper exercise of discretion because: (i) 'Sufficient cause' for the entire relevant period had not been established in law; (ii) The explanation was largely an 'excuse' of bureaucratic negligence, squarely falling foul of the post-Postmaster General jurisprudence; and (iii) The exercise of discretion was based on erroneous legal premises and extraneous considerations (perceived merits), rendering the order 'clearly wrong' and liable to be set aside. Conclusions 2.38 The High Court was not justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days. The explanation did not disclose 'sufficient cause' for the entire period from the start of limitation to filing; it primarily reflected internal negligence, inaction and bureaucratic apathy. Reliance on perceived merits and public-interest considerations was misplaced. 2.39 The condonation order was therefore set aside; the appeal was allowed; costs were imposed on the respondent housing corporation; and the executing court was directed to proceed with execution of the decree and conclude the proceedings within a fixed time frame.