Limitation Act delay condonation requires a full, bona fide explanation; inordinate administrative delay cannot justify extension.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires sufficient cause for not filing within the entire period of default up to the date of filing, not merely after limitation expires, and the explanation must cover the full delay. A condonation order is discretionary, but appellate interference is justified where the discretion is exercised on irrelevant, arbitrary, perverse, or legally untenable grounds. On the facts, a delay of 3966 days in filing a second appeal was not supported by bona fide sufficient cause; gross administrative lethargy and internal official inaction did not justify extension of limitation. The order condoning delay was set aside and execution of the decree was allowed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (ii) the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay; and (iii) whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal.

Issue (i): the meaning and import of the expression "within such period" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Analysis: Section 5 permits admission of an appeal or application after the prescribed period only if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring it within such period. The expression "within such period" was interpreted in the setting of the provision as referring to the entire period commencing from the time limitation begins to run and continuing until the actual filing, not merely to the delay after expiry of limitation. The provision was held to require an explanation for the whole continuum of delay, while still leaving room for a justice-oriented and context-sensitive evaluation of sufficiency of cause.

Conclusion: "Within such period" covers the entire period of default up to the date of filing, and sufficient cause must be shown for that full period.

Issue (ii): the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with an order condoning delay

Analysis: An order condoning delay is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on relevant material and in accordance with law. Appellate interference is warranted where the order is vitiated by absence of sufficient cause, non-consideration of relevant facts, reliance on extraneous considerations, or a view that is plainly unreasonable, arbitrary, or perverse. The appellate court does not sit to prefer one plausible view over another merely because it would have reached a different conclusion.

Conclusion: Appellate interference is justified where the discretion to condone delay is exercised on untenable grounds or contrary to law.

Issue (iii): whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 3966 days in filing the second appeal

Analysis: The explanation furnished by the respondent was found to disclose gross administrative lethargy rather than a bona fide and sufficient cause. The Court held that bureaucratic delay, inaction of officials, and reliance on the supposed merits of the underlying dispute do not by themselves justify condonation, especially where the delay is inordinate. The High Court was held to have erred in treating the merits of the case and the respondent's internal lapses as a sufficient basis to extend limitation.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in condoning the delay.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order condoning delay was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and execution of the decree was directed to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condonation of delay requires a bona fide and sufficient explanation for the entire period of delay, and appellate interference is warranted where the discretion to condone is exercised on irrelevant, arbitrary, or legally untenable grounds.

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