Statutory limitation under the Electricity Act cannot be extended beyond the fixed outer limit, and Article 142 cannot override it.

A special limitation scheme under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 permits an appeal within 60 days, with a further extension not exceeding 60 days on sufficient cause, and the outer limit is mandatory. Once that ceiling expires, the appeal cannot be entertained and delay beyond it is not condonable. Article 142 cannot be used to override this express statutory bar, because a court must respect a legislature-fixed limitation regime. Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply unless the earlier proceeding was pursued with due diligence and good faith; time spent in a review filed after expiry of the relevant period could not be excluded.

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Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 could be entertained beyond the statutory outer limit of 120 days; (ii) whether Article 142 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to condone delay beyond that limit; and (iii) whether the time spent in pursuing review proceedings could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 could be entertained beyond the statutory outer limit of 120 days.

Analysis: The provision grants 60 days to file an appeal from communication of the Tribunal's decision, with a further period not exceeding 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. The limitation scheme is special and mandatory, and the legislature has fixed a maximum period within which the appeal must be filed. Once that outer limit expires, the Court has no power to entertain the appeal under the statute.

Conclusion: The appeal could not be entertained beyond 120 days, and the delay beyond that limit was not condonable.

Issue (ii): Whether Article 142 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to condone delay beyond that limit.

Analysis: The power under Article 142 is broad, but it cannot be exercised to defeat an express statutory command founded on public policy. Where Parliament has prescribed a special limitation with a capped extension, the Court must respect that limitation and cannot use Article 142 to override it.

Conclusion: Article 142 could not be used to condone delay beyond the statutory ceiling.

Issue (iii): Whether the time spent in pursuing review proceedings could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 14 applies only where a party has prosecuted another remedy with due diligence and good faith. The review application was filed after the expiry of the relevant period, so the requisite diligence was absent. The time spent in review therefore could not be excluded to save limitation.

Conclusion: Section 14 did not assist the appellant, and no exclusion of time was available.

Final Conclusion: The statutory bar on limitation governed the appeal, neither Article 142 nor Section 14 could extend the time, and the appeal was liable to be rejected as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a fixed outer limit for condonation of delay, that limit cannot be enlarged by invoking Article 142, and exclusion of time under Section 14 is available only when the prior proceeding was prosecuted with due diligence and good faith.

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